UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : 24-CR-206(NCM)

-against-

: United States Courthouse

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: Brooklyn, New York

: Thursday, August 7, 2025

: 10:00 a.m.

HALIMA SALMAN,

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF CRIMINAL CAUSE FOR ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE HONORABLE NATASHA C. MERLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

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APPEARANCES: (Continued.)

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Proceedings recorded by computerized stenography. Transcript produced by Computer-aided Transcription.

#### 3 Oral Argument 1 (In open court.) 2 COURTROOM DEPUTY: Criminal cause for oral 3 argument in United States of America versus Halima Salman, 4 Docket No. 24-CR-206. 5 Would you all please state your appearances for the record starting with the Government. 6 7 MS. SHAMI: Good morning, your Honor. Assistant United States Attorneys Amanda Shami and Andrew Reich for 8 9 the Government. We're also joined by an intern in our 10 office, Shriyah Singh. THE COURT: 11 Good morning. 12 MR. REICH: Good morning. 13 MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: Good morning, your Honor. 14 Federal Defenders by Mia Eisner-Grynberg and Sam Jacobson for Ms. Salman. Also, we are joined by attorney 15 16 Michael Price from the NACDL. 17 THE COURT: Good morning. Good morning, 18 Ms. Salman. 19 Can you hear me? 20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I can. 21 THE COURT: So we're here for oral argument on 22 defendant's pretrial motions and, as I indicated during our 23 last conference, I am particularly interested in the 24 parties' arguments regarding Ms. Salman's motion to exclude 25 evidence at ECF Number 75.

# Oral Argument

I have thoroughly reviewed the briefing and I want to hear from the parties as to their various arguments and I have a few questions.

So I will hear from the parties if they have anything additional to their materials, to their briefing. And, if not, then we can move to the next motion. I won't be covering defendant's CIPA motion today; so I will be covering the other motions instead.

And I want to start with ECF Number 75, defendant's motion to exclude evidence. Specifically, the photograph of the alleged military training document.

Is it going to be you, Ms. Eisner-Grynberg?

MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: I will give you an opportunity to make any additional arguments that you may want to make for this motion.

MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: Thank you, Judge.

It's our position that under various rules of evidence, both the photograph of a training document is not admissible. Most importantly, the Government has not and cannot sufficiently authenticate the document, and the Government cannot prove any exclusion or exception to the hearsay rule.

Just briefly on the authentication point. Nothing about this document makes it more likely to be authentic

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## Oral Argument

than inauthentic and that's what the Government, as a proponent of the evidence, has to show. The Government has put forth a document that is partially typewritten, partially handwritten, and that is signed by an unknown person who the Government has never even claimed to identify, Umm Yousef. The Government has not put forward any evidence or proffered any witness that can tell us this is a real person, a person with an identity, a person who is in a position of authority to sign a document or write a document such as this, and the document lacks all other indicia of reliability.

The Government has not put forward evidence of any witness with any knowledge that any of the contents of that document are true. They are not calling as a witness the supposed declarant, Umm Yousef. They're not calling as a witness any person who claims to have ever seen Ms. Salman at this training. They have no evidence that Ms. Salman has admitted to the training; in fact, they have the opposite, she's denied it. They have no witness whose ever claimed to have heard her state that she's been to the training. Thev have no witness who was present for the training. The document is not dated and there's no location on it. document doesn't have a stamp which is the critical identifying mark of genuine documents like this.

Without that information, with nobody to confirm

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## Oral Argument

that the document is real. That a real person wrote it.

That it was made at a time where trainings such as this were held. That it was made at a place where documents such as this were held; or that any person can corroborate any piece of the document aside from what is known by others, which is

Ms. Salman's nickname, the document cannot be authenticated.

The Second Circuit case of *United States v. Vayner* is dispositive here. That case found in a different circumstance the document that purports to be about an individual but is not written by that individual, that contains only information that is known by others and known specifically by others who have a reason to fabricate such a document is not sufficient to authenticate the document.

As for hearsay, the Government --

THE COURT: May I ask you about authenticity before you move on?

MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: Yes.

THE COURT: I know a lot of the issues you raise, which I think are real issues, and I'll hear from the Government on them. And obviously, it is the Government's burden to prove authenticity but is there any reason to believe the document is fake aside from the speculation about the benefits that the husband would gain from forging such a document?

MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: Yes.

## Oral Argument

As a step back, there is no evidence to suggest that it's real. The Government has not put forth any similar document that has itself been authenticated. There is nothing suggesting that this document or any document that looks like this document has ever actually been awarded to or written about a person who actually attended a training.

THE COURT: Didn't they say they're going to put forth other women, I'm paraphrasing, but I believe they're going to put forth women who know something about the training documents. They're going to put forth FBI agents who supposedly know something about the document.

Are you saying that that's not adequate?

MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: I'm saying that's not actually what the Government has proffered. The Government says they have a female witness who is present in Syria at the time that Nusaybah Khatiba, the women's brigade, began and has seen documents like this. They have not proffered that this person was the recipient of such a document or the author of such a document, that she attended any of these trainings or held any of these trainings. There are known witnesses who presented these trainings and that's not who the Government's calling here.

So for the Government to say we have a witness who is a woman who has no familiarity with this document, and

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# Oral Argument

has not received or authored such a document but has seen documents like this is not sufficient to prove authentication. Neither has the Government put forth any expert witness or agent who has experience with this specific type of document. The Government has said that they have an ISIS document expert, unnamed, who will opine on this document. The only witnesses that the Government has called in cases like this whose offered that kind of testimony have themselves noted that many documents of this specific type are fraudulent, specifically, ISIS documents that have a typewritten portion and a handwritten portion have been found by the Government's expert to be fraudulent time and time again. And the reason that that's the case is because the bureaucracy that was in place widely disseminated documents of this type making them easy to fabricate. This document is unlikely to be real, specifically, because it lacks the stamp that genuine ISIS documents have. Time and again, and in district courts such as in *Musaibli*, courts have found that the ISIS stamp is what tells us the document is real. And that's because that stamp tells us various important things about the providence of the document. It tells us specifically where it was issued, when it was issued, by whom, and that person's authority to issue the document and none of those are present here.

On the Government's comparators, which are themselves unauthenticated, seven of the eight of them have such a stamp. Most of them say, this is the Government that issued this document on this day, at this location, by this actual person. And from that information, the trier of fact, and here the Court, can say this document is more likely to be real because we know where it came from and who authored it and who they were and when and where it was made. None of that is present here.

We do not know if this document was made at a time or place where trainings even existed, and we do not know if this document was made at a time or place that Ms. Salman was in those places. So without any of that corroborating information, there's simply nothing here that suggests that it's real and several factors that suggest that it's fake.

THE COURT: So the Government, obviously, has an argument under §901(b)(4) about the circumstances of the seizure. And I assume that other evidence was found on the phone that they think lends that is more likely to be authentic or at least authentic enough to get in front of a jury.

Is your argument that the surrounding factors for this search or the seizure of this photograph is not adequate?

MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: Surrounding circumstances

## Oral Argument

make it more and more likely that this specific document is real. What the Government says is that this document was found on a cell phone that was collected by U.S. military forces from the person who is believed to be Ms. Salman's husband. And that it was located in his phone in an area where his purportedly genuine documents are. If you compare those documents to this document in the same way, it demonstrates why this document is not real. The documents that they're talking about all contain an ISIS stamp that says when it was issued, where it was issued, by whom, and that person's position of authority.

And they contain specific corroborative and corroborated information about Ms. Salman's husband; for example, the narrative portion that talks about where he was on a certain day. Why he was not present for military service on that day. What happened when he came to a hearing to discuss where and why he was not present at that hearing. None of that is present here.

The fact that this document is also on the phone that contains documents that are more likely to be true does not lend any legitimacy to this document. A person can certainly possess any number of real documents and also a fake document. And the fact that this one lacks the distinctive characteristics of the real documents or the more likely to be real documents is dispositive.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: On the hearsay point, even if the Court finds that this document reaches the bar for authentication which, again, we'd say it doesn't on the papers. But, at a minimum, requires a hearing where these witnesses can come forward and be cross-examined about who they are and why they believe the opinions that they're making are true. Even if the Court, after a hearing, finds the document to be authentic, it is hearsay and it is not admissible and this court is bound by *United States versus A1-Moayad*. That's 545 F.3d 139 out of the Second Circuit in 2008.

A1-Moayad, there was a document purporting to be by a person with a nickname named "Abu Jihad." And Abu Jihad, like Umm Yousef, was never identified by the Government as a specific person or as a real person or as a person with authority to make this kind of document. In Abu Jihad's documents, Abu Jihad said that Al-Moayad, who he did not call Al-Moayad, he called him by a nickname, just like Umm Katab in our case, is the person who recommended him for admission into al-Qaeda. The Court found that on the record before that Court, there was not sufficient evidence to admit the statement as a co-conspirator statement for the exact same reasons as present here.

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#### Oral Argument

In that case, the district court had made no findings, and was unable to find, that there was an existence of a conspiracy at the time the document was made by the unknown Abu Jihad just like the unknown Umm Yousef here and the actual Mr. Al-Moayad just like the actual Ms. Salman here. The Court found, for example, that evidence that Mr. Al-Moayad had previously offered any kind of support to al-Qaeda at a different time than this document was not itself sufficient to establish at the time this document, their document, was made there continued to be a relationship between those people. They found that there was no information that Mr. Al-Moayad had any kind of relationship with Abu Jihad. They found that there was no information that Al-Moayad knew who Abu Jihad was or that he was aware of this document. All of those circumstances are the exact same as here.

The Government's alleged corroborative evidence that Ms. Salman had at any time and in any place even tacitly supported ISIS, a characterization that we reject, but simply, for example, by being present in its territory or taking a photograph with its flag at some other time does not support that she was in a conspiracy with whoever Umm Yousef was at the time that this document was made. And, again, the reasons we know that is we do not know the time that this document was made because the Government has

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## Oral Argument

never proffered a time that this document was made. They've proffered a time when the photograph they believe was taken. That's in March of 2018. And they've proffered a front-end date of mid-2017 when Ms. Salman married her husband, who is listed as her husband, in the document. And no evidence as to whether trainings, genuine trainings, actually existed in that time period or in the places where she was.

Umm Yousef, if that's even a real person, was in any kind of relationship with her that would give Umm Yousef the ability to recount the things noted in the document. And certainly, there's no evidence that Ms. Salman was aware of this form. We know from the evidence that the Government, the agents, showed it to her and she stated she was not aware of this form and she denied that its contents were true.

So there is nothing about *A1-Moayad* that is different in our case. And, in fact, the circumstances in that case were more likely to have established a conspiracy given the evidence in that case that Mr. A1-Moayad had materially supported in that case A1-Qaeda which is not evidence that's present here.

Until the Government can establish who Umm Yousef is, that this person is a real person who exists and had the authority to sign a document like this, there cannot be any conspiracy proven between Ms. Salman and a potentially

fictitious person or a person we have no ability to probe whether or not they were real and whether or not they were in a position to sign a document like this one. The Government claims to have witnesses who are present in that time and in that place, and they do not proffer that any of these witnesses can tell us who this person is.

The Government says that Ms. Salman must have been in a relationship with this person because she signed her training document, that belies common sense. Documents, graduation documents and the like, are signed all the time by the person who is not the trainer themselves. Nobody in this document purports that Umm Yousef was the trainer herself and no actual trainer is being called by the Government to corroborate who this person is.

And finally, the fact that the Government has found other documents that purport to be signed by this same person does not advance the ball either because those documents are themselves uncorroborated.

Each of the pieces of evidence that the Government says makes this document more likely to be true and makes the conspiracy between Umm Yousef and Ms. Salman more likely to have existed relies itself on something that's uncorroborated. And until one of those pieces can be met with sufficient evidence that can then downstream corroborate the Government's other claims, this document is

25 corroborate the Government's

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not authentic and its contents are hearsay.

THE COURT: Are you going to talk about best evidence?

MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: Yes.

Our position that admission of this document also violates the Best Evidence Rule. It's clear that this document is not an original. It appears to be a photograph of one side of a folded-up piece of paper that would, if real, have some corresponding original. That original would be itself the piece of paper. And this document does not meet the exceptions that are otherwise required to admit a duplicate because of the questions about the authenticity of the original itself.

THE COURT: Let me confirm I understand.

Is the question that you're raising whether the document itself for the Best Evidence Rule whether the original itself is authentic or whether the photograph is an accurate copy of the original?

MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: It's both, Judge. We have no idea if the photograph is an accurate copy of the original because we have no evidence as to the contents of the original.

In terms of the original itself, we have no reason to believe that that's authentic for all of the same reasons that I've already given. Missing importantly here is

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## Oral Argument

anything corroborating that this document ever was real or ever had an original because the Government has not provided any supplemental corroborating evidence that we would expect to exist and that did exist in other cases like this such as in *Musaibli* and *Al Jumani*.

In those cases, there existed rosters from the ISIS side of people who had attended military trainings such as this, people who are in a military battalion; people who are being paid for their military service. In this case. the Government found and turned over the contents of a hard drive that they say appear to belong to an ISIS bureaucrat. And missing from that hard drive is any corroboration that this training existed or that Ms. Salman attended it. If it was true that Ms. Salman voluntarily attended a training such as this one, there should be some record, a sign-up sheet, an attendance log, a list on ISIS's side of who the people are that they awarded these diplomas to, a list on the weapons provision side of the weapons that were provided to and when and so on. And because there are none of those corroborating documents, there are questions about the authenticity of the original which require it to be admissible under the Best Evidence Rule.

The Government has said in its pleadings, in an unsworn pleading, that they've looked for the original but can't find it. That's not sufficient. The Second Circuit

883
Oral Argument 17
has told us that in order to find in order to use a
duplicate, you must have a showing of the diligent, but
unsuccessful, search and inquiry. It's not enough to just
say, We can't find it so we can just use other evidence.
And for all of the reasons that the document is not
authentic, it also cannot qualify as a duplicate.
THE COURT: What else do they need to show?
MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: They need to show exactly
the items that I was just mentioning.
THE COURT: No, I'm sorry. For them to establish
that they don't have access to the original, I think they're
saying it's in Syria, ISIS controls the document; it's been
destroyed. Do they need to give me a list of items they did
to find the document.
What else do they need to do?
MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: That requires testimony of a
witness with knowledge as to their search and their
inability to find any such document.
THE COURT: So if Ms. Shami says, We searched far
it; these are the steps we took to search for it that's
still not adequate?
MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: If she says that under oath
or in a sworn affidavit, that would be further along than we

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else for this motion?

are here.

24

#### Oral Argument

MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: Judge, I would just note if the Court has any questions. The Government raised a question as to the timeliness of the motion. The motion is clearly timely. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure §12(b)(1) states that, At any time, a defendant may raise by pretrial motion and objection that the Court can determine without a trial on the merits. That's what we've done here. There is no time bar or time set in that rule for when motions of this type are to be filed.

And it's our view that this motion is most efficient for the Court to decide this motion now because this motion is outcome determinative to the case. This is the only evidence supporting the only charge in the indictment. If the Government does not have this training certification document, the Government cannot make any showing, let alone beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ms. Salman attended military training.

So just like the gun in a suppression hearing for a §922(g) charge. In this case, if the Court excludes the document as we argue it must, the case must be dismissed. So deciding that question now is the most efficient way to determine the outcome of this case.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Shami.

MS. SHAMI: Thank you, your Honor.

## Oral Argument

I actually do want to start with the question of the timeliness and Ms. Eisner-Grynberg's reference to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure  $\S12(b)(1)$ . Had they continued to read the notes for  $\S12(b)(1)$ , they would have noted that under the 1944 Advisory Committee Notes on its adoption that  $\S12(b)$  motions, and there have been changes to the numbering, but the thrust is that  $\S12(b)(2)$  and  $\S12(b)(3)$  currently in the Rule, they actually identify the full universe of what pretrial motions may be brought under  $\S12(b)(1)$ .

It states in that note that paragraphs that classify into two groups all objections and defenses to be interposed by motion. In one group are defenses and objections which must be raised by motion. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver.

In the other group are defenses and objections which, at the defendant's option, may be raised by motion. Failure to do so, however, not constituting a waiver. Nowhere in the list at (b)(2) and (b)(3) is there a listed item for a motion in limine which makes it completely distinct from the defendant's example of the suppression of a gun in a  $\S922(g)$  case. Suppression is absolutely itemized in  $\S12(b)$ . Under  $\S12(b)(3)(C)$ , for suppression of evidence. It is appropriate to seek the suppression of evidence pretrial especially where, usually in a  $\S922(g)$ , there is an

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allegation of some kind of Fourth Amendment violation that would lend itself to a legal resolution.

Here, what the defendant has raised, an evidentiary issue that is typically brought during motion in limine practice; in fact, it is titled "A Motion to Exclude a Fraudulent Document." At the same time, although the Government believes that the defendant has actually no vehicle to bring this motion right now and there a reference to §12(b) does not support this motion, the Government won't object if the Court wants to resolve this issue now. And if the Court wants to resolve this issue now, I think that the issue that defense have raised on all of the questions about what is missing or what the Government hasn't shown or why the document is fake all miss the mark because they all go to the veracity of the document.

THE COURT: Before you move on, I want to confirm then you are no longer taking the position that I guess the Court doesn't have the authority to have a hearing sooner rather than later.

MS. SHAMI: Well, no. I mean, I think the Government still believes that an evidentiary hearing at this point would be untimely and would require the flying in of witnesses and an enormous amount of work just to determine what the Government believes actually is very easily and straightforwardly determined based on the fact of

a Second Circuit case that was issued two weeks ago that actually undercuts the entirety of the defendant's argument with respect to authenticity versus veracity.

Sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I guess you didn't really answer my question. If I decided I wanted an evidentiary hearing, the Government is no longer objecting and saying, I need to wait for a trial date to be set?

MS. SHAMI: No, the Government still believes that an evidentiary hearing should be held closer to trial. What we're seeing is that even though the Government does not believe that this is an appropriate vehicle for the motion, meaning, that it's just -- there is no basis for this motion; it is an improper motion. The Court can just dismiss it out of hand based on fact that it is improper.

What we're saying is it's fully briefed, if the Court wants it resolved, it can. But if your Honor still wants an evidentiary hearing, the Government submits that it should be closer to trial.

THE COURT: And why is that?

MS. SHAMI: Because that is the typical practice for evidentiary hearings. The Government would need to be presenting multiple witnesses. We would be preparing for multiple witnesses, bringing them into the country for several of them.

THE COURT: How close to trial?

MS. SHAMI: I think that the Government's motion, opposition, noted that for the majority of them it was a couple months before trial.

THE COURT: I looked at your examples. In a number of those, the hearing was scheduled perhaps a month or two before trial but then the trial date was adjourned. I wouldn't adjourn a trial date, so why would I wait until the last minute to have this hearing?

MS. SHAMI: Your Honor, it's not last minute, it's just --

THE COURT: It's the last minute to me, sorry. A month before is the last minute for me. So why would I wait until then to have it and then potentially have to adjourn the trial date? In three of the examples you gave me, the trial date has to be adjourned; so, why would I go that route instead of having it sooner rather than later?

MS. SHAMI: Your Honor, I think if the concern is that a month does not give the Court enough time to resolve the issue, certainly, you can set it sooner than one month out before trial. But I think what the Government is saying we don't even have a trial date set. We haven't completed pretrial motions on the six other motions that the Government has raised. We are still obviously briefing CIPA. The defense has raised a number of discovery issues

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

that they want us to look into. And, in fact, as the Court knows, made a production last night or yesterday morning.

And the Government is looking into producing an additional drive from NMEC. And so, at this point, we are not near a trial date to be even able to work backwards from that date.

And so, I would submit that if you're arguing or you're -- not arguing -- if you're saying that it would potentially derail a trial, I understand that concern and I hear you that let's look at the trial date and then work backwards to what would make the Court comfortable in terms of a timing for that.

THE COURT: Thank you. Continue.

MS. SHAMI: Sure.

With respect to all of the issues that the defense has raised about the document, calling into question several items about its qualities, the lack of insignia, lack of stamps, lack of dates. These all go to the reliability, the veracity, or the weight of the document not to its admissibility and, in particular, its authenticity.

Authentication, of course, as the Court knows in United States versus Tropiano, 252 F.3d 653. A Second Circuit case from 2001. Authentication, of course, merely renders evidence admissible leaving the issue of its ultimate reliability to the jury. And although the proponent of evidence has to adduce is sufficient evidence

to support a finding that the proffered evidence is what it's claimed to be. And then the opposing party, the defense here, would be free to make all of these arguments to a jury about why they should not rely on this document.

But the authentication, your Honor, turns entirely on the fact of whether or not the Government can establish and, in fact, the defendants concede that we have, that the phone belonged to the defendant and that the Cellebrite extraction --

THE COURT: Her husband.

MS. SHAMI: Her husband, excuse me.

That the Cellebrite extraction is of the phone.

Two weeks ago, the Second Circuit decided in United States versus Adamou, and it will be published at an F.4th, but currently, there's only a WestLaw citation and that's 2025WL2025147. And on WestLaw, it's noted as United States versus Gonzalez.

But in either case, the Circuit affirmed the black letter law that under Rule 91 to satisfy the requirement authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that it is what the proponent claims to be. It is not a high hurdle. And here, just like in *Gonzalez*, the Circuit found expressly that Rule 91 was satisfied where the Government proved that the cell phones were owned by who the

Government said they were owned by, there the defendants; 1 2 here, the defendant's husband and offered testimony from 3 analyst who interpreted the data from the Cellebrite and 4 explained the process by which it was extracted and that the size of the forensic extraction of the physical cell phone 5 matched the size of the data contained in the extraction 6 7 report. 8 That is all that is necessary. It just shows the 9 provenance. 10 THE COURT: What type of evidence was it? 11 MS. SHAMI: A Cellebrite report just like this 12 one. 13 THE COURT: Was the document that they were 14 authenticating, is it a text message? Was it a diploma? 15 It was text messages and I think there MS. SHAMI: was some other documents on the report. But I think the 16 point is that it looks to the question of the Cellebrite 17 18 extraction. The question here, is there any issue with the 19 Cellebrite extraction? There isn't. The defendant's 20 husband had a phone; it was seized from him upon his arrest. 21 It was taken by the SDF; it was then given to 22 Coalition Forces who then extracted it in a bit-for-bit 23 forensically sound way creating a Gold Copy. And there is 24 no suggestion, and the defendant never responded to any of 25 the items that the Government raised, noting that there is

no suggestion that the document itself was doctored or there was anything that happened to the forensic image and that is all that is necessary.

Indeed, in *Musaibli --*

THE COURT: Let me make sure I understand because I don't have case in front of me.

If it was extracted appropriately bit for bit or whatever you said. If it was extracted appropriately, then presumably the picture is authentic? Presumably, the picture of the original is thus authentic?

MS. SHAMI: What is on the Cellebrite report is authentic. Authenticity is not the same as veracity. The question of whether or not the document is exactly what it purports to be and is a fake or fraudulent document as the defense calls it or, in the Government's view, a true document that shows the defendant committed the crime of receiving military-type training from ISIS is beside the point.

The question is: Is the document itself authentic? And here, is the extraction authentic? Can the Court be assured that there is a chain of custody. And even there, the Court was very clear that a chain of custody may not be perfect. That also goes to the weight, not to the admissibility.

Authenticity is a question of whether or not the

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## Oral Argument

Government can establish this document is what it is. And here, what the Government is stating is that this document is a photograph from the defendant's husband's phone. That is what is at issue here. It is a picture that was taken off of the defendant's phone. Off a phone that the defendant agrees was her husband's phone. Off of a Cellebrite extraction that was forensically made.

And, your Honor, you have a copy of the decision from *Adamou*. If you don't have a copy and would like to look at it or to have a copy of it if you would like.

But I think the other point here is that even in Musaibli, the district court had no issue with authenticity for most of the documents. The issue in the Sixth Circuit was the question of hearsay. And all of the issues that the defendant raises with respect to *Musaibli* that was present there that is not present here, that is actually not If you look through all of the exhibits and what accurate. insignia, characteristics, et cetera were present in each. In fact, one of the exhibits bears no insignia and the witness, the live witness, Mr. Al Madioum, and I'll spell that for the Court. It's A-1 space M-a-d-i-o-u-m. testified as to that particular exhibit that he didn't have access to that database but that it contains the types of information that would typically be present which makes him exactly the same as the female witness that the Government

> Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

#### Oral Argument

would offer. She has seen documents exactly like this. She didn't say she saw the defendant's document, but as the Court knows, the document is a photocopied typewritten template in which a person will fill in by hand the information related to the woman who took the training, her husband, and his ISIS number as well as what she is authorized to possess and what she's already been authorized to possess. In that way, she is exactly the Government's proffered witness is exactly like Al Madioum who did not have -- he had not previously seen the exhibit that had no insignia on it but was able to say, yes, this is the type of stuff that they would typically save.

And I think what's really important here, your Honor, is that the Circuit didn't have to reach authenticity on this issue because the district court had determined that authenticity was present for most of these documents. The issue wasn't authenticity, it was hearsay. Authenticity simply is, is this document what it claims to be? And here, is this a photograph of a Cellebrite extraction taken from the defendant's husband's phone and emphatically it is. The defendant even concedes it.

Instead, what the defendant argues is, here are all the reasons why I should doubt that it's reliable.

Those are questions for a jury. Those are precisely the questions for the jury. The jury is the ultimate arbiter of

the document's ultimate reliability. The defendant can present all of these same arguments and say, Where is the stamp?

The other concern that I understand that defense has raised is with respect to, well, the other document the Government has found hasn't been authenticated. We're not at trial, the expert deadline for the Government has not passed which is two months before trial. The notion the Government hasn't presented expert testimony yet is frankly ludicrous when the expert testimony or the expert disclosure deadline is teed off of trial as should the evidentiary hearing.

The Government has proffered, however, that it will be presenting testimony from an ISIS document expert and an ISIS expert. These proffers of what the Government will be demonstrating at trial are sufficient at this juncture for the Court to determine that the Government would be able to admit this document, and frankly, the entire Cellebrite extraction at trial.

THE COURT: I need to make sure I understand.

I think this argument is slightly different than the argument in your briefing. But I'm understanding you to say that as for the for authenticity, you only have to determine that it is a likelihood that the document is a document or is a picture of a document that was on

Ms. Salman's husband's phone. That gets you past the authenticity hurdle and then you'll have to deal with hearsay.

MS. SHAMI: Exactly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. SHAMI: Would you like me to turn to hearsay or would you like to me speak further?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. SHAMI: With respect to hearsay, and just give me a moment to organize myself.

Musaibli is instructive here. That is the case where the district court reached the issue of hearsay, found that there was no conspiracy, and the Sixth Circuit reversed entirely. And the defendant in her reply argued that there is a difference because there is more information provided in Musaibli but that is not actually accurate.

As a practical matter, *Musaibli* does not require testimony of someone with knowledge. Rather, *Musaibli*, in the Sixth Circuit, indicated that the additional testimony by Al Modium dispel any lingering doubts. However, the Court determined that the three items that you look at to determine whether or not there is a co-conspirator statement were all present. Was there a conspiracy? Did it exist? Second, were the declarant and the defendant part of that conspiracy? And third, was the declaration by the declarant

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

made during, and in furtherance to, the conspiracy?

And the Government submits that all of those factors are met. The defendant erects all of these hurdles and requirements that are nowhere found in any case.

Instead, it tries to collapse the question of authenticity with the question of whether or not it's hearsay and also with respect to the defense argument regarding best evidence. All of it boils down to the defense's critiques of whether or not the document is real but those are separate questions.

On the first instance, is it authentic? Yes, it is a document that was pulled off of an extraction off of the defendant's husband's phone. And the Government can show the chain of custody for that and will have testimony to fill in the blanks.

The next question is hearsay. Yes, the conspiracy that existed is a conspiracy to provide material support to ISIS in the form of the defendant's service to ISIS. That is why she took military training. Was the declarant and the defendant part of that conspiracy? Yes. Because Umm Yousef signed the document. The Government noted in its brief that it is our position that she must have supervised in some way the training. The Government didn't she say she was the trainer.

THE COURT: Who is Umm Yousef?

	Oral Argument 32
1	MS. SHAMI: Excuse me.
2	THE COURT: Who is Umm Yousef?
3	MS. SHAMI: Umm Yousef is the woman who signed the
4	document.
5	THE COURT: I got that. Who is she? Is that her
6	real name?
7	MS. SHAMI: That's her pseudonym.
8	THE COURT: You know who this person is?
9	MS. SHAMI: The Government does not know her true
10	identity, no.
11	THE COURT: How do you know that's not her true
12	name? How do you know that's her kunya.
13	MS. SHAMI: Umm Yousef because it follows the
14	convention for kunyas. So Umm is "the mother of" and Yousef
15	is a male name. So it could be that her first son, the
16	eldest son, is Yousef, that's typically how it's done, or
17	you can choose whatever name you want. In the case, the
18	defendant chose the name Umm Ali. She has no son named Ali.
19	She has no son Ali, she chose it because her husband was Abu
20	Ali Al Korsani Algermani.
21	THE COURT: The question is, how do we know
22	Umm Yousef is a real person?
23	MS. SHAMI: There is no question that this
24	document is, or that the picture, is of a document, right?
25	The question is, it's not whether or not I think

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	Oral Argument 33
1	one someone clearly wrote the document. Clearly, this is
2	a template and clearly there's handwriting on it. The
3	question of who wrote it is not dispositive or relevant to
4	the question of is the document real? The document is real,
5	it exists.
6	THE COURT: We're talking about hearsay. Do you
7	not have to demonstrate that she is in a conspiracy with
8	Umm Yousef?
9	MS. SHAMI: Yes. And to do so, you know that the
10	declarant it is all outlined, in fact, in the document.
11	It is completely appropriate to rely
12	MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: Judge, I'm sorry.
13	I'm hearing from Ms. Salman that they're frozen
14	and they can't hear the proceeding and that does appear to
15	be the case.
16	THE COURT: Okay. Give us a moment.
17	(A brief pause in the proceedings was held.)
18	THE COURT: Welcome back.
19	Ms. Shami, I was asking who Umm Yousef is and if
20	you do not need to know that this person exists to establish

that there is a conspiracy.

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MS. SHAMI: The Government does not need to know who she is but her real name is to establish that a conspiracy existed. The document is real and that it exists as a picture on a Cellebrite extraction. It didn't come --

> Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

THE COURT: That is an authenticity argument. I'm asking about hearsay, no?

MS. SHAMI: It is also a hearsay document inasmuch as the defendant is saying that we have no proof that there is a real person; there is a real document. The questions that the defense raise collapse on each other. And it is because by taking each item in the document and saying the Government hasn't proven each of these elements, they haven't shown who Umm Yousef is.

THE COURT: Let's forget -- not forget -- let's move past what the defendant is saying.

MS. SHAMI: Sure.

THE COURT: I am looking at the document, it looks like hearsay. You're saying there is a conspiracy. ISIS is a conspiracy. Umm Yousef is part of the conspiracy because this person signed this document. And somehow Ms. Salman is in a conspiracy with Umm Yousef, I guess, because this document is about Ms. Salman.

Is that your argument?

MS. SHAMI: Receiving training, thus materially supporting ISIS or being in a conspiracy materially supporting ISIS by means of her service to ISIS, yes.

THE COURT: But you know or you think you know that based on this document. So you're using a hearsay document to establish conspiracy?

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

MS. SHAMI: Yes. And that is actually permissible under Second Circuit law to use the statements themselves. But there also needs to be other factors that corroborate it. And here, what is corroborative is the fact that there are two other documents.

THE COURT: Can you tell me the Second Circuit case that you are referring to that says you can use hearsay to establish?

MS. SHAMI: Sure.

THE COURT: If it's in your briefing, you can point me to the page.

MS. SHAMI: Yes.

It's the Second Circuit *Musaibli* case that says: Statements generated by ISIS' bureaucratic apparatus to support the mission of providing the terrorist group with personnel and services --

THE COURT: Slow down just a little bit.

MS. SHAMI: I'm so sorry.

Statements generated by ISIS' bureaucratic apparatus to support the mission of providing the terrorist group with personnel and service fit comfortably within the alleged conspiracy scope.

Just give me one moment, your Honor.

 $\label{eq:THECOURT: Take your time.} \ \ I \ \ think \ \ we \ \ need \ \ to$  reconnect.

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

	Oral Argument 36
1	MS. SHAMI: Okay.
2	THE COURT: Do we need to reconnect?
3	MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: They can hear.
4	THE COURT: You can continue when you're ready.
5	MS. SHAMI: Your Honor, I can follow up with the
6	case. I am having a hard time finding it. It might just be
7	in my notes, something that I read as part of preparing for
8	today.
9	THE COURT: I think so. I think when I reviewed
10	your briefing you cite the rule but I didn't see any case
11	law so if you could provide that.
12	MS. SHAMI: Absolutely, your Honor.
13	THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
14	You were saying that there's other corroboration.
15	MS. SHAMI: Yes. And that is the existence of
16	Umm Yousef is corroborated by the additional documents that
17	were identified on the more senior ISIS fighter's hard
18	drive. In those documents, Umm Yousef signed two military
19	training documents and they bear the insignia, the ISIS
20	stamps, that the defendant put so much stock in. In fact,
21	they are with additional documents authorizing other
22	resources to the Nusaybah Katiba which means that the
23	Nusaybah Katiba also existed.
24	I want to also return to something that the
25	defendant has said in the reply and said during the last

# Oral Argument

status conference that the Nusaybah Katiba was small; that it was only 100 people. The defendant mischaracterizes the statement of facts in Allison Fluke-Ekren's case. In the statement of facts, it states that Allison Fluke-Ekren herself only trained 100 people in Raqqa. It has nothing to do with the full volume of women who were trained. There were multiple trainers. There were multiple locations for training.

In fact, the Government expects to provide to the defendant a hard drive that contains sign-ups by over 900 women in an eight-month time period in Raqqa, the vast majority of whom seek to learn how to use an AK-47 or a suicide belt. And Raqqa is not the only location that training existed.

The Government has witness testimony that training happened in Mayadin where the defendant was -- where she got married. And one of the documents, in fact, on the hard drive that has an insignia stamp that the defendants have noted is important to them is stamped by the Al Barrakah Governorate and that encompasses a territory that includes the city of Hajin where the defendant also was.

So the idea -- and additionally, the documents also show stamps from Alfurat Governorate, which is in Iraq, which demonstrates that there was training happening in multiple locations. And the Government need not tell the

# Oral Argument

defendant. If the Government doesn't know, the Government does not know precisely where the defendant received her training. The important piece is that the defendant received training and the Government should be permitted to make that argument to a jury by presenting the evidence from the defendant's husband's phone which were retrieved via a bit-for-bit Gold Copy Extraction and are thus authentic, and thus show a conspiracy. And, your Honor, frankly, the conspiracy could also include her husband inasmuch as the defendant was seen on video being taken by her husband practicing. And the fact that his name was on the training document itself.

Certainly, the defendant has --

THE COURT: Was it his statement? Going back to hearsay. If you're saying she was in a conspiracy with her husband, even if she was, if he's not the declarant in the document, does that matter?

MS. SHAMI: It's an additional person in the conspiracy. And I think here, you know, conspiracies can have hundreds, thousands of people. It depends on what the conspiracy is and how it is being identified.

I think the Government's view here is that the defendant's view of, like, rigidly identifying who is Umm Yousef, and if the Government can't do that then they can't prove the conspiracy. The Government, first of all,

rejects that because Umm Yousef was a person, she signed multiple documents including documents that were routed to more senior ISIS people and stamped.

But apart from that, given that the defendant's husband's name is also on the document, and given additional documents that the defense will receive from the hard drive, that indicate that the husband had to permit or OK his wife taking the training, the Government could also argue that he is part of the conspiracy inasmuch as he OK'd her taking the training because, again, it was voluntary which actually goes back to another argument that the defense made with respect to compulsory training that was also --

THE COURT: I want to stay on hearsay.

MS. SHAMI: Sure.

THE COURT: Perhaps ISIS is a conspiracy, perhaps her husband was part of ISIS and part of the conspiracy. You would have perhaps a stronger argument that they were co-conspirators but her husband is not the declarant. If, my understanding, to get over this hearsay by the conspiracy theory, you'd have to show that she's in a conspiracy with the declarant which is Umm Yousef.

MS. SHAMI: Yes.

THE COURT: How do you intend to prove that the statement is made, that she was in a conspiracy with Umm Yousef and that the declaration was made during the

### 40 Oral Argument 1 course of a conspiracy? 2 MS. SHAMI: Because the document itself notes the inclusion of both the defendant and Umm Yousef. 3 4 THE COURT: You're going to use the hearsay document to prove the conspiracy to get the hearsay document 5 6 in? 7 MS. SHAMI: Yes. 8 THE COURT: And you're going to provide me a case 9 that tells me that you can do that? 10 MS. SHAMI: Yes, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 But, in either event, the Government MS. SHAMI: 13 also submits that the residual exception would also permit 14 the admissibility of this document. And that is because it was made in furtherance of the conspiracy and it meets the 15 16 requirements of §807 which is that it has sufficient circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness and it is more 17 18 probative on the point for which it is offered than any 19 other evidence that the proponent can obtain through 20 reasonable efforts. 21 Here, the evidence of the trustworthiness of the 22 military document is significant. The fact of the matter 23 is, it was taken off of a Cellebrite extraction. I've said 24 this, and I don't want to repeat myself, but it is an

important point. It is on her husband's phone it is in a

	Oral Argument 41
1	folder called "Adari Stuff."
2	THE COURT: You told me earlier that that
3	goes to authenticity, not veracity.
4	MS. SHAMI: It does go to authenticity.
5	THE COURT: You're saying that it also supports
6	its veracity?
7	MS. SHAMI: Hearsay is also about authenticity but
8	it's also about the question is, is the evidence of the
9	trustworthiness of the document. So now we're moving to the
10	question of trustworthiness and that is a question that is
11	part of §807. And so, here we're talking about
12	trustworthiness: How can the trust that this document is
13	what it purports to be? First, it was on her husband's
14	phone.
15	THE COURT: I'm sorry. Maybe I need to take a
16	closer look at this because you just said that let me go
17	back to my handy court reporter here.
18	So here we're talking about trustworthiness. "How
19	can you trust that this document is what it purports to be.
20	First, it was on the husband's phone."
21	MS. SHAMI: Yes.
22	THE COURT: That sounds like a straight
23	authenticity issue. I want to know how can you trust the
24	statements, how do you overcome hearsay by demonstrating
25	that the statements in this document, even if we agreed that

the document -- that the picture is an accurate, authentic picture of a document, of an original, how do we trust the statements in the document? But you're telling me that's it's trustworthy because it came from the phone.

MS. SHAMI: Yes, your Honor.

In the first instance, I use the word
"trustworthy" because that is what comes from the rule.
§807 asks whether the document being offered, or the
evidence being offered, has sufficient circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness. I understand how that can
seem alighting with the question of authenticity and they
are interrelated. There is a question of how can you trust
that this document is what it purports to be and that is the
question that is asked on §901.

So here, I mean, the analysis is pretty similar. But here, focusing specifically on §807, the phones were seized from her husband, a terrorist, a member of ISIS, shortly before ISIS fell in Baghouz and it bears substantial indicia that Abu Ali used that phone. There were multiple documents on the phone that belonged to him. There were multiple pictures of the defendant and her husband on the phone. The document itself was located in a folder on the phone that the defendant's husband had created for ISIS material. It was surrounded by additional other ISIS documents. When you examine the metadata of the picture

# Oral Argument

itself, it was taken by the husband's phone along with several other photographs taken at or around the same time that he then, through the metadata analysis, you can see he transferred to a folder related to all of his ISIS materials. There are no additional versions of the document suggesting the defendant's theory of the case which is that he forged the document to be able to get more weapons which is also belied by the fact that the document itself notes that the weapon is already in her possession.

And I will also note, your Honor, that there is a video of her using an AK-47, practicing. He gives her an instruction. And then when she sees that he's videoing her, she puts the AK-47 down near an ISIS flag and she took multiple pictures of herself in front of an ISIS flag or an AK-47. The ISIS flag picture she sent to her husband. She made the decision to send a selfie in front of an ISIS flag and send it to her husband via Share It app. These are circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.

Moreover, the Government will be able to offer testimony from a woman who was in ISIS territory, who was present near Nusaybah Katiba's founding, near people in the Katiba, saw documents exactly like this one.

The fact of the matter is, your Honor, it is a typewritten document and you could actually -- when you look at the documents themselves, you can see that they're

# Oral Argument

photocopied documents. And so, there were documents being created for women who were receiving training. And it's because what is the document itself? It is an authorization to carry a weapon. The defendant needed the authorization to be able to carry that AK-47 that she is practicing with, that she is seen on video practicing with.

And so, all of these items demonstrate that the document has circumstantial indicia of trustworthiness coupled with the testimony of a witness who saw this precise kind of document and would be able to tell the Court and a jury why this document was issued and why it's important. And that's because a woman needed to have it to be able to hold a weapon.

THE COURT: And so, everything you just said about trustworthiness and why she needed the document and all that. You're saying all that goes to support why we should trust Umm Yousef and what she declared in that document.

MS. SHAMI: Yes, your Honor.

And, in fact, Umm Yousef appears on two documents that were also stamped. The fact is that defendant puts a lot of stock in the ISIS stamps. And you have two documents signed by Umm Yousef that were stamped and approved and routed through the governates of ISIS which further support that this was a person who was signing training documents for women and they were found on devices.

# Oral Argument

I will note that that the fact of this particular, like the photocopy itself, the template, and the filling of the person's information being found on three separate devices. The defendant has no supposition as to why it exists on three devices. Why some of them have stamps. Why they're also in connection with other documents authorizing Nusaybah Katiba resources. It is because the Katiba was authorized to allow women who wanted to volunteer to fight for ISIS, to wear a suicide belt for ISIS, to drive for ISIS, to cook for ISIS, a medium by which they can measure out and exact their allegiance to ISIS. And that is what the document shows, and it shows that multiple women wanted that opportunity and that the defendant was among them.

I think your Honor asked questions of the defendant about the Best Evidence Rule. And here, I think the Government believes it made out its arguments in the brief. But I do want to just say that the notion that the Government has to provide the original of a photographic rendering of a document would basically eviscerate the Best Evidence Rule. It exists for situations like this where the original is not in the Government's possession.

The Government has tried to find this original document. Of course, the Government would much prefer to provide an original document at trial. But the Government cannot find it in its electronic repositories. And in so

# Oral Argument

far as ISIS might still have the original or it might have been destroyed, the fact of the matter is that lots of the cities that were besieged by the SDF, by the Syrian Arab Army, by Coalition Forces, there was lots of damage. The Government does not have the document and the idea that the Government can't present the next best thing, which is an exact picture of the document, would basically render the Best Evidence Rule a dead letter.

THE COURT: What do you have to present to demonstrate that you made efforts to obtain the original?

MS. SHAMI: So, your Honor, all there is really necessary is testimony that, or an affidavit, that the Government has tried to do so, and the Government can do that. If the Court needs an affidavit from the Government.

THE COURT: Does the affidavit have to include the steps that you took to locate it? I mean, because from what I'm hearing right now, I'm assuming that it's no longer available because it's in Syria or in ISIS-controlled area, so it seems like we're assuming.

Do you have to show that there is some additional steps taken?

MS. SHAMI: Your Honor, I don't know if there are specific steps that need to be itemized or whether or not it's just simply a statement that the Government made its best efforts. I can get back to you in a letter, or the

Government can get back to you on that in a letter as to what the affidavit might contain.

THE COURT: Why don't you send me the affidavit.

And in the affidavit, when you say you made your best efforts, you can tell me what those best efforts include generally. And if I want more detail, I will let you know.

MS. SHAMI: Okay.

THE COURT: Because, like as I stated, I understand where the original is presumably located. And so, I'm wondering if we're just presuming that it doesn't exist which may be satisfactory, which, given where it's located, but I want to know the full universe of your best efforts before I decide.

MS. SHAMI: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. SHAMI: And then I think the final issue that the Government opposed in its opposition relates to the probative value of the document.

And here, I think it's interesting that the defense has raised the question of, well, it's just like a fake drivers license, and a fake drivers license is not probative compared against eight other fake drivers licenses, but a fake document can be probative.

The Government believes this document is real and it is genuine and it represents the fact that the defendant

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### Oral Argument

received military-type training. But a fake drivers license in the possession of a person who is charged with aggravated identity theft is probative. It is probative of the crime. It is probative of the mens rea of the defendant charged with aggravated identity theft. The fact that there is a document on her husband's phone authorizing her to carry a weapon coupled with the video of her carrying a weapon is The Government believes that it's genuine and will submit testimony and evidence that it is genuine. the question of the probative value of it, it is clearly probative to the charged crime and the Government is entitled to present that evidence. And the Second Circuit's reversal in Garnes made it very clear in affirming that the Government has to be permitted to present evidence of the res gestae of the crime charged and that is what this document does.

Also, I want to just conclude on one point and I'm happy to answer any questions.

But the defendant has said multiple times now that the admissibility of this document is case dispositive suggesting that the Government would dismiss the case if the Court ruled it inadmissible. I don't know how the defense would presuppose to know what the Government's other avenues would be in the event of an adverse ruling but I just wanted to say that the Government believes the defendant committed

#### 49 Oral Argument this crime and will continue to prosecute this case. 1 2 THE COURT: Thank you. 3 MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: May I respond to the 4 Government's argument? 5 THE COURT: Quickly. MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: First of all, what the 6 7 Government has stated that what Adamou stands for is 8 fundamentally incorrect. 9 THE COURT: Remind me of which one -- Adamou 10 stands for? This case where the 11 MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: 12 Government says, as a profound premise, that if items are 13 pulled off a Cellebrite report they are admissible. 14 THE COURT: That's not admissible truly. 15 MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: That's obviously not true. The rules of evidence apply to each piece of 16 17 evidence and their contents that are put before a Court. 18 It's clearly not the case that so long as any piece of 19 evidence is photographed on a phone and then pulled off the 20 phone by a Cellebrite that the authentication question is 21 cured. That's not a rule of evidence and that's because 22 evidence is only admissible in terms of what it is being 23 offered to prove. Here, the Government is offering to prove 24 this training document to prove the truth of the matter 25 asserted therein, that Ms. Salman did receive training. The

fact that --

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THE COURT: Ms. Shami, I think, she's trying to chop up the argument a little bit, right? She's saying this is a picture that was on her husband's phone and that she proves that, or she tries to prove that, and then she moves on to hearsay. You're saying she can't chop it up that way.

MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: Yes. The fact that it is authentically taken from the phone doesn't do anything to tell us whether the contents are authentic and that's the part that matters. Imagine this. Imagine right now I print out the exact template of the training document in this I fill it out with all of the exact same information that is in our case. And then on the signature, my oldest son's name is Brent, B-r-e-n-t, I sign "Umm Brent," I take a picture of it with my phone and I send it to the FBI. FBI plugs Cellebrite into it and pulls it out. There is no question that it is a photograph of the document that I created. But there is also no question that it is an inauthentic document. I, Umm Brent, are not a person who can make a document certifying Umm Katab or Umm Ali to receive an AK-47.

THE COURT: But isn't it an authentic document, there is just no veracity to it.

MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: No, it's not an authentic document for the purposes that it will be offered in a trial

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

against Halima Salman, it's fake. The document is not what it purports to be. It purports to be a graduation certificate from training. That's what it's being offered for. And I, Mia, "Umm Brent," am not authorized make that kind of document. So it can't reach even the low threshold of authenticity. And it also then would not meet the threshold for a co-conspirator statement because "Umm Brent" is not or never was in a conspiracy with Halima Salman. know that to be true.

Your Honor asked the Government, who is

Umm Yousef? How do we know that she is a real person? And
the Government has no answer to that question. So they
can't prove that the defendant was written by a person that
they don't know to even exist, it's entirely circular.

THE COURT: I think she says that Umm Yousef has signed other documents that had the insignia.

MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: Right. That also doesn't make this document any more likely to be true.

THE COURT: Are you saying Umm Yousef is a real person?

MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: Who knows? It might be a fictitious person who people in this area sign the document as. Or she might have been a real person, which the Government has not established, who signed the other documents and then not Umm Yousef signed this one.

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

#### Oral Argument

Let's go back to my example. I, Mia

Eisner-Grynberg, see a document signed by Umm Yousef. I
say, okay, now I know when I make my fake document,
Umm Yousef is one of the people authorized to sign. So I
write Umm Yousef or I trace Umm Yousef. My document is not
true, it's both inauthentic and it's still hearsay because
the declarant in the case is not actually Umm Yousef. The
declarant is me. Just because I write "Umm Yousef" on it
doesn't prove that Umm Yousef, an actual person if she is
one, was actually the declarant. And the Government is
offering no evidence, zero, that Umm Yousef is actually the
declarant of this document.

The Government is saying that this document was made by a person that they don't know who it is. They don't know if she is real. They just said they don't know where it was made. They said they don't know where it was made. But the Court can trust it because it was found on a phone. That eviscerates both authenticity and hearsay. The document is made, as the Court pointed out, by a declarant. The declarant is proffered to be Umm Yousef. Umm Yousef is proffered to be, we don't know. If instead of Umm Yousef it said "Jane Doe," we would be in exactly the same position. We have no idea who this person is even if this is a person.

If, for example, Ms. Salman's -- somebody in Ms. Salman's life made this document and that person then

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

#### Oral Argument

was the true declarant and they signed "Umm Yousef," we would be in exactly the same position that we are here. And that person would not have been in a position to speak on her behalf to certify the truth of the matter asserted.

The idea that we should turn to §807 is frankly absurd. §807 is to be used only in the most trustworthy circumstances. That's what the Second Circuit said in Parsons versus Honeywell that the Residual Exception would be very rarely used only in exceptional circumstances. Those are where the authenticity is least in question where we're certain that the document is real and there's just a question about the truth declared by this declarant. That's the opposite of the situation that we're in here.

When we have myriad questions about whether the document is real and the defendant concedes they have no idea who wrote it, and if the person who wrote it is even a real person, that would be the last place we would use the Residual Exception rather than here.

Just to last point out. The Government has just stated that they have corroborating evidence for 900 other women who signed a sign-up sheet to attend this training. Notably absent from that is Ms. Salman. When we said we think there should be a sign-up sheet or a roster, that was our supposition based what we've seen in other cases.

Now, the Government now tells us that that's true

and she is not on here. So, again, that's yet another reason to doubt the authenticity of this document.

MS. SHAMI: Your Honor, I would like to respond to a couple of these points. I also found a case that said that you can rely on the hearsay statements themselves. So at least I have that. I would like to provide to your Honor.

There is a Supreme Court case Bourjaily versus
United States, 483 U.S. 171. In making a preliminary
factual determination of these elements, the Court may
consider the hearsay statements themselves; however, they
are unreliable. For such statements to be admissible, there
must be some independent corroborating evidence of the
defendant's participation. And the Government submits that
there is.

Regarding the quote, sign-up sheet, I don't believe that I characterized it as a sign-up sheet. I characterized that there is evidence on a drive that will show that over 900 women sought to sign up and that I cabined the specific time and also I believe, and if I haven't, I'll cabin it in right now. These are sign-ups in Raqqa. The defendant has indicated that she was not in Raqqa. So the fact that her name is not going to be on it is not dispositive of anything. It is dispositive of the fact that she was not in Raqqa. So it's not a fake document

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

showing that she's on a list that she otherwise couldn't be on because she was not in that location.

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And to return to the defendant's example of if she created a document on her own phone and signed it. Your Honor is absolutely right, it would be an authentic document on her phone. But there is no corroboration for a Mia Eisner-Grynberg to sign her son's name on a document and purport it to be a training document. However, a woman who traveled to ISIS territory with her parents. Who turned 18. Who married an ISIS fighter. Who went to live with the ISIS Who took up arms and practiced on an AK-47. Took pictures of herself with ISIS. Who socialized with ISIS supporters. Who also, while in the camps, continued to socialize with ISIS supporters and demonstrate her own support of ISIS by, and I'll reference here the chat that the Government referenced in its defense, excuse me, not the defense, the detention arguments that have thus subsequently been produced to the defendant showing that she joined a chat, or was added to a chat, that had extremist content. The defendant was in ISIS territory, married to an ISIS terrorist; the daughter of an ISIS terrorist; taking pictures in front an ISIS flag; practicing with an AK-47; arrested two days before Baghouz fell where only the die-hard ISIS supporters and fighters were.

There is sufficient corroborating evidence to

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	Oral Argument 56			
1	demonstrate that the document found on her husband's phone			
2	is authentic. Unlike a Mia Eisner-Grynberg document that is			
3	on her phone sitting in Brooklyn being offered to the FBI			
4	for reasons unknown.			
5	Thank you, your Honor.			
6	MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: I'll clarify. I'm not			
7	Halima Salman. In my example, I'm Umm Yousef. I cannot			
8	certify that Halima Salman went to my training because there			
9	was no training held by me. And I'm not an appropriate			
10	person to be making that declaration. Just the same a			
11	Umm Yousef who the Government concedes may not even be a			
12	real person.			
13	THE COURT: Thank you. That clarified a lot.			
14	Maybe.			
15	Let's move on to ECF 76, the NMEC database.			
16	Mr. Price, if you want to make any additional			
17	arguments in addition to your briefing and then I think I			
18	may have a few questions for you.			
19	MR. PRICE: Yes, your Honor. Good morning.			
20	With respect to the NMEC motion here, the Court			
21	needs to answer two questions:			
22	First, was querying NMEC a separate Fourth			
23	Amendment search?			
24	And second, were those queries reasonable?			
25	We are not, right now, at a point where we can			

actually have that argument. We do not know what queries the Government ran.

We don't know --

THE COURT: I'm sorry to cut you off. Let me ask you preliminarily.

I believe the parties are conferring about some discovery issues in defendant's motion to compel. Should I be holding this motion in abeyance pending that motion to compel and whether some of the issues are going to be resolved?

MR. PRICE: Yes, your Honor.

So, as background, the defense has narrowed our discovery requests with respect to NMEC. We sent those to the Government. We are waiting for a response from the Government to those more narrow requests. We have not yet received one except that we are scheduled to have a meet and confer tomorrow afternoon.

The issues there, as we spoke about the last time, relate to the database itself. You know, which database was searched? What's in it? What were the parameters of that search? That goes to the first question that the Court has to answer.

Was this database so big and different from searching, say, just a single cell phone that searching it amounts to a Fourth Amendment event. So we need additional

information from the Government about the database itself to answer the first question. The second question, assuming that the Court finds.

THE COURT: Sorry. To put a finer point on it.

So you don't think that whatever the Government comes back with tomorrow, you don't think that's going to resolve the motion then?

MR. PRICE: I don't think, whatever the Government comes back with, it will not resolve the substantive motion. We will then presumably argue about whether the facts that they disclosed meet the standard or not.

THE COURT: I see. Okay.

So first you need to know whether this database is a dragnet?

MR. PRICE: So that is question number one. We have a little bit of that information from the *Musaibli* case. We know, for example, that the NMEC database is 66 times the size of the §702 database in *Hasbajrami*. We know that it contains more and different sensitive types of information than just the e-mails in the §702 database.

I think based on that, this court could conclude that querying was a Fourth Amendment event. The next question is whether those queries were reasonable because they were, of course, done without a warrant. The reasonableness, the Fourth Amendment standard, kicks in at

that point. And, as in *Hasbajrami*, as the Second Circuit remanded back to Judge DeArcy Hall to determine, it is necessary to examine those queries themselves to know what they are in order to determine whether they were, in fact, reasonable. We don't know what the queries were in this case, we are asking for that information. We would also like to know what was returned in response to those queries.

We do not have that information either.

and we're going to obviously ask the Government questions as well -- but would you agree that the queries targeting another person? I seem to remember the Government saying that it wasn't Ms. Salman's name at least, I have questions if it was other searches that perhaps were related to her. But do you agree that the queries were targeting another person and were not Ms. Salman's name related to Ms. Salman, those queries would not violate the Fourth Amendment?

MR. PRICE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PRICE: So, even in *Hasbajrami*, some of the queries were not for Mr. Hasbajrami.

THE COURT: How do you know that?

MR. PRICE: In the Second Circuit opinion and in the E.D.N.Y. opinion.

THE COURT: I thought in Judge Dearcy Hall's

opinion, she redacted the queries. Was there something else in there that which you know what the queries were?

MR. PRICE: It does state that the supplemental record consists of -- sorry.

Nonetheless, because redacted use terms associated with defendant in databases containing Section 702 acquired information, these queries are subject to the Court's foreign intelligence exception analysis.

THE COURT: Can you give me a pincite?

MR. PRICE: I can in a moment.

It's going to be in the E.D.N.Y. 2025 opinion; so, at Page 11. So that's WestLaw, 2025 WestLaw 447498 at Star 11. It describes the queries that were Remen Hasbajrami with a lot of redactions; however, it does become clear that they were searching for terms other than Mr. Hasbajrami's name. And the Court finds that those queries are still subject to its Fourth Amendment analysis because they concern Mr. Hasbajrami; they were about Mr. Hasbajrami.

THE COURT: That was included in my question. I said, I think my question was, would you agree that the queries were targeting another person. So they were not Ms. Salman's name or related to Ms. Salman then those queries would not violate the Fourth Amendment. So here it seems like they were related to Mr. Hasbajrami if they were not related to him or to Ms. Salman do we not have a Fourth

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	Oral Argument 61		
1	Amendment issue.		
2	MR. PRICE: The queries need to be related to		
3	Ms. Salman involved in the investigation of her sure.		
4	THE COURT: What does that mean? This may be		
5	what does that mean to be related to?		
6	MR. PRICE: I'm speculating here because I don't		
7	know what queries they ran. But if they ran queries for her		
8	family members seeking information about her, that would be		
9	about Ms. Salman.		
10	THE COURT: So if they searched her husband's name		
11	or they searched her father's name?		
12	MR. PRICE: Correct.		
13	THE COURT: You would say that that's related to		
14	Ms. Salman.		
15	MR. PRICE: Yes.		
16	THE COURT: Okay.		
17	MR. PRICE: Again, we are speculating about what		
18	those queries were at that point. We don't actually know		
19	what the Government was searching for. But, yes, the		
20	question then that the Court will ultimately have to answer		
21	is: Were those warrantless queries of this database		
22	reasonable?		
23	And <i>Hasbajrami</i> , Judge DeArcy Hall found that		
24	reasonableness in this context means get a warrant. That		
25	the Government had every opportunity in the many years that		

transpired between the collection and the use to obtain a warrant. Here, that was four years.

The initial collection of these phones was in 2019. The Government says that it ran its first NMEC search some time in the second half of 2023. It is, I think, entirely reasonable, as Judge Dearcy Hall found, to require the Government to get a warrant at some point in those four years. Especially -- this is not information that was being intercepted in real-time and acted upon. It was data that was seized, put into a massive database where it sat for four years until the Government went on its fishing expedition. This is an, in our understanding of this, a warrantless search of data from and about Ms. Salman through that query.

THE COURT: Can I confirm?

So I understand you to be saying, given the size of the database, and assuming for now that the queries were Ms. Salman's name or related to Ms. Salman that that's the Fourth Amendment violation. And I want to confirm that you take this position even if Ms. Salman was in Syria at the time of the search. I believe in <code>Hasbajrami</code>, he was in the United States in another, I think, perhaps, who knows, important difference is that the information that was seized and funneled into the database was also seized in the United States where this information, as I understand it,

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

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was seized internationally and then perhaps housed domestically. So is this query of the database of the search would that be a domestic search or a foreign search.

Yes, so that's my...

MR. PRICE: It's our opinion here it's the query that counts. And the query here was done, I believe, in Maryland. That's where NMEC is located. But the Fourth Amendment event happened here in the U.S., in Maryland and not abroad.

THE COURT: So you would say it's a domestic search even if the information was gathered overseas and, I guess, it's housed in servers in Maryland perhaps.

MR. PRICE: We're not contesting the constitutionality of the initial collection.

THE COURT: I agree. I understand that.

I think I still need to determine whether it's a domestic search or a foreign search. And I'm not sure from Hasbajrami that it matters just where NMEC is located. If it's your argument that all that matters is where NMEC is located, okay, but I'm not sure from Hasbajrami.

MR. PRICE: It matters where and when the search occurred. And it was a domestic law enforcement query done in the United States targeting a U.S. citizen.

THE COURT: Does it matter if a U.S. citizen wasn't in the U.S.?

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

MR. PRICE: I do not believe it matters to the

THE COURT: Okay.

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analysis.

MR. PRICE: I would also add, your Honor, as far as the timing goes here that one of the things that the Second Circuit was concerned about in Hasbajrami was the Government going back and conducting a fishing expedition across this massive database here. They draw a distinction and they say, you know, we would treat this differently. Ιf it was, say, happening in real-time, if there were interceptions, if information was being passed back to the FBI for purposes of investigation. But here we know that that was not the case. The marriage certificate was obtained by the Government in 2019. They did not have any derogatory information about Ms. Salman by their own admission until February of 2021. That was disclosed, I think, yesterday in the Government's production.

So what we're dealing with here is not some sort of continuing ongoing investigation, there was a -- there was a collection. There was no supposition that Ms. Salman was engaged in ISIS-related activity at that time. It wasn't until years later that the Government went back, queried this database for her and for information about her, that they obtained this derogatory information.

So that, I think, puts us squarely in the fishing

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

#### Oral Argument

expedition category as opposed to, say, the police officer going back to check the evidence locker. That's the distinction that the Court is trying to make in Hasbajrami when deciding whether a query of the database is a Fourth Amendment search saying, is it more like an officer going back to the evidence locker to check one piece of evidence that they've already seized? Or is digital different, right, combining, you know, hundreds of thousands of devices in a database that is known to collect information about U.S. citizens. Is that different than just going back to the evidence locker to check?

We submit that it is here in the same way that searching the §702 database later on for domestic law enforcement purposes is its own Fourth Amendment event. I do believe that we need to have additional information from the Government about the queries that they ran. Whether that is a record of the searches that they performed and the results. Or, as in <code>Hasbajrami</code>, declarations from the Government about what searches they ran and what those results were. Or we can have live testimony from anybody who ran those searches? But we're going to need to know what those searches were in order to assess their reasonableness.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Shami.

MS. SHAMI: Yes, your Honor.

So I think the fundamental flaw in the defendant's argument is this superimposition of <code>Hasbajrami</code> on to Fourth Amendment law and trying to supplant black letter Fourth Amendment law in place of a statutory framework that has its own definition of a breached person. That has its own minimization requirements. That has its own requirements for what the FBI must do to be able to query. And that by Judge DeArcy Hall's own recognition has changed since the time of <code>Hasbajrami</code> making the Court's decision completely siloed to only the facts of that case where she declined to reach any other case or to indicate any applicability.

I think, as a baseline, the defense seems to be that if there is a database, and there is a search of it, then that is a Fourth Amendment event and that is not the case.

THE COURT: I don't think that's what he's saying.

MS. SHAMI: It is essentially the case because, in the first instance, the Government argues here based on the collection that the search took place abroad. The search is the extraction of the phone that took place in Iraq. There is no question that the extraction took place in Iraq and the extraction is the search. The extraction is what takes the information off of the phone and then it is provided to NMEC to put into a database. That is no different than an

# Oral Argument

individual who is picked up by the police and then has information put into the N.Y.P.D. database and that N.Y.P.D. database can be searched later on, has this person been arrested before? That information was already provided, it goes into the database. It is like a DNA database in the same way. That database can always be queried because the information in it was seized through lawful means.

Here, it was seized lawfully because -- for so many reasons. The first is that it was seized abroad from a non-U.S. citizen. And even if he was a U.S. citizen, the Fourth Amendment not apply extraterritorially whether it's a U.S. citizen or a non-U.S. citizen. The SDF, a separate foreign entity, seized the phone from the defendant's husband and then provided it to the United States and Coalition Forces who then, overseas in Iraq, extracted it, conducted the search in Iraq, and then provided that to NMEC.

So, in any way that you frame it, the subsequent querying is similar to going back to the evidence locker because the evidence was provided to NMEC by a foreign nation via Coalition Forces.

THE COURT: I'm wondering if we're miss -- you're saying that extracting the information is a search?

MS. SHAMI: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: What is the definition of a search?

MS. SHAMI: Well, the search here is, like, the search and seizure of the phone. So the seizure of the phone is when it was physically seized from Abu Ali's person.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. SHAMI: The search is the extraction of the phone. Taking the information from the phone and being able to then search it because, right, the Government did search the phone. DoD did search the phone and then provided it to the Intelligence Community.

And actually I think --

THE COURT: What does that mean "the DoD searched phone"? Just that they extracted it, or did somebody actually look at it? Yes?

MS. SHAMI: Yes. So, again, the purpose of why DoD collects devices abroad, as outlined in the Government's brief, is to be able to mine it for intelligence information. It is critical when you are conducting a military operation against a terrorist organization to be able to get intelligence from what you are seizing.

And so, that is why in 2019, the FBI received information about the marriage certificate because there was an ongoing mining of the information seized abroad and being conducted and searched abroad. But the extraction itself is the full search being provided to NMEC so that it can also

be used by law enforcement which is consistent with the statutory language related to DoD providing to law enforcement information evidence seized abroad.

THE COURT: So the entire phone isn't extracted and then going to NMEC. It's extracted, it's evaluated, and then what they deem important is put into NMEC?

MS. SHAMI: No, the full phone. It has to be bit-for-bit Gold Copy Extraction. That way it's forensically sound.

THE COURT: How is that a search rather than just an extraction and you're storing it in a database at NMEC?

MS. SHAMI: Your Honor, extraction is the search. When the Government extracts information from a phone, that is part of when we get a search warrant, we have to do that, right? If we have a phone in our possession, we cannot simply extract it. Part of the extraction is covered by the search warrant. And then the seizure, what we're searching for specifically, is what we are ultimately are authorized to search for and seize. But the extraction itself can't happen without authorization. But in the circumstance here --

THE COURT: In *Hasbajrami*, the Second Circuit says there is an additional Fourth Amendment event when you query what was seized. So why is that not a query? Or why is that query not a search?

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

MS. SHAMI: Yes, your Honor.

It's because the way that <code>Hasbajrami</code> collected the information is far different. Your Honor hit it on the head when you indicated this is partially a domestic collection. The collection that is described in <code>Hasbajrami</code> is quite specific as to what's happening. It is very different than the seizure of physical evidence: The phone, the device, the laptop. And the extraction of the information abroad. It is not real-time, as the Second Circuit provided, real-time collection of communications which is what I think the Second Circuit had made that dividing line that this §702, in their understanding, accomplishes this particular outcome.

Whereas, we're talking about devices. Devices have nothing to do with Hasbajrami; it has nothing to do with §702. It has nothing to do with FISA. The imposition of that statutory framework on a device is inapposite. The Court should be applying the Fourth Amendment precedents which is that if you do not have standing, and the defendant doesn't have standing, it was not her phone. She did not assert it vicariously. The phone belonged to her husband.

I think it's also important to note how the information about the defendant's criminality came to light because the defendant characterizes it as a fishing expedition. But the Government's brief shows how

# Oral Argument

information basically trickled in. They received the marriage certificate. They then saw the Kem photo book that showed her with pictures of her with an ISIS flag, with an AK-47. They then requested the Gold Copy. They saw -- there were documents they could not understand because they were either in Arabic or German and sent them for translation.

And then subsequently, they received a translation as part of another search that did not name the defendant. And they were able to see, in fact, the defendant received military-type training from ISIS. It was not a fishing expedition to find crime by her. It was the fact that evidence existed on a device that was extracted lawfully abroad of a device that was seized by a foreign partner, and by "foreign partner," I mean a foreign military partner and nothing to do with any kind of agency which is one of the factors that the Government notes in its brief would be relevant but is not present here because the SDF is a separate entity from U.S. law enforcement. U.S. law enforcement did not direct SDF to do anything. And apart from that, then was able to look at the information.

But I'll also note what the Government noted in its brief which is that the Fourth Amendment doesn't require a warrant in every single instance. Reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. There are a number of

instances where a search is permitted without a warrant.

As the Government notes in its brief, stops under Terry, they are Fourth Amendment events but those events do not require a warrant. A border search does not require a warrant. The touchstone is reasonableness. And here, it was reasonable for the Government to search a database that contains extractions. The search results received from abroad of a non-U.S, or even a U.S. citizen, but the defendant was not -- was not her phone and to search that information. And even if the Court determines that it was not appropriate, the good-faith exception would still capture all of this because the Government has been searching NMEC. Evidence from NMEC has been submitted and admitted, or presented to be admitted, at trial and it has been found to be admissible.

So there was nothing that would put the FBI on notice that there was some kind of inappropriateness to the search. But, as a fundamental matter, the Government believes that both because the defendant did not own the phone, she was abroad, it was her husband's phone, and because it was seized by a foreign entity, that the Fourth Amendment framework that's applicable to all of those scenarios would find that there was no search here that required a warrant.

The only way that the defendant gets to the point

# Oral Argument

of a warrant is by superimposing FISA and §702 on to the Fourth Amendment. And that's just not appropriate here because the definition of "aggrieved person" in FISA is far different than how the Fourth Amendment defines it.

If you have any questions, I'm happy to answer them but that is my response to the defendant's arguments here.

THE COURT: I do have questions. Just a moment.

Mr. Price, I am still not clear. Well, you just said because the definition of an aggrieved person is different. But I am still -- the distinction you are trying to make between what happened here and what happened in Hasbajrami is not clicking for me. They said that the database was a dragnet. They got redacted versions of what the queries were to determine. Judge DeArcy Hall redacted versions of the queries to determine whether the Fourth Amendment applied to the search, meaning, to me, that the search was using those queries of the database which was a dragnet to search for information concerning Mr. Hasbajrami or whatever was searched.

That is what I understood *Hasbajrami* to be saying. But now I think you're saying that we don't look at *Hasbajrami*, we just look at the Fourth Amendment because the definition of an aggrieved person is different. But that's based on Ms. Salman being in Syria. Based on the search or

# Oral Argument

the extraction happening overseas. But it seems in Hasbajrami they're saying that it is the collection of data which constitutes a dragnet that is important. I don't know that it says where the collection happened. That's why I was asking the defendant, defense counsel, as well. Does it matter where the extraction happened or does it matter where it's stored? What matters here?

MS. SHAMI: I think that it does matter, your Honor. I think domestic law acknowledges that there is a differential perspective when you're talking about prospectively seized information whether it's a Title III wiretap or a FISA or a §702 versus something that exists on a device that the Government has or, here, in this instance, the SDF has seized and has turned over to the Government. These are very specifically different circumstances. And the defendant only is able to get to the point of querying is a problem by first stating that the database itself matches on to what was at issue in <code>Hasbajrami</code> but that's just not applicable.

The database in *Hasbajrami* is different than the NMEC database. The NMEC database contains information captured abroad and the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit are very clear that evidence abroad is treated differently, it just is. It is different than domestic collection. And apart from that...

THE COURT: So it doesn't matter if the database is a dragnet. If all the information that's in it is abroad, then you can search whatever you want to search?

MS. SHAMI: Your Honor, it's not that it's all abroad. It's the question of how it was seized. The Second Circuit and the Supreme Court have noted that if the seizure happens abroad, and it's done by a foreign entity, and then given over to the United States, that does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the Fourth Amendment is not extraterritorial.

THE COURT: So if you -- if it's seized by a foreign entity, given to the United States, and it's stored in a dragnet database then you can search whatever you want to search?

MS. SHAMI: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. SHAMI: I obviously wouldn't call it a dragnet database.

THE COURT: You're saying it doesn't matter how much information is in there as long as it's extracted by a foreign entity and given to the United States.

MS. SHAMI: Here, it was seized by a foreign entity and extracted by Coalition Forces in Iraq. But, yes, effectively everything that happened with respect to the search happened abroad. The seizure, the extraction, all of

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

#### 76 Oral Argument that happened abroad and then it was turned over to the 1 2 United States. 3 THE COURT: That's what makes it okay to search 4 it? 5 MS. SHAMI: Yes. THE COURT: 6 Okay. 7 MS. SHAMI: Your Honor, I think here in Hasbajrami 8 I want to add the point that this dealt, Hasbajrami dealt 9 with a highly sensitive and classified set of information. 10 That is not what's happening here. There is some transparency as to -- the Government has turned over at this 11 point four devices, soon five devices, of information that 12 13 was seized. It's because it was seized, we have the 14 extractions, we're able to search it. The defendant has the ability to search those devices just as well as the 15 16 Government does because they have the full Gold Copies. 17 The sensitivity around *Hasbajrami* does not affect 18 the Fourth Amendment interests that the Supreme Court and 19 Second Circuit have otherwise verbalized in a number of 20 opinions about the extent to which the Fourth Amendment 21 requires reasonableness. And here, the reasonableness 22 standard does not require a warrant. 23 THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask you some other 24 questions. 25 MS. SHAMI: Sure.

# Oral Argument

THE COURT: To clarify, on Page 67 of your opposition, the Government states that: No evidence would be traced to the queries of NMEC extractions naming the defendant. I want you to say it plain. Are you saying that you didn't make any searches related to Ms. Salman, or just that you didn't search her name?

MS. SHAMI: What we're saying is that the Government did search her name. And that's itemized, not itemized, that's reflected, excuse me, in the search warrant that the Government sought in respect of her G-mail address. The Government noted that it had run searches for her name.

The important piece of this is Judge DeArcy Hall did an analysis in *Hasbajrami* where she traced the queries to determine whether or not there was a Fourth Amendment violation that collapsed with the warrant requirement which the Government submits is not the correct way to have analyzed that because the question of reasonableness and whether a warrant is required are separate questions.

But putting that aside. So here, if you were to analyze the queries that returned the inculpatory information, the individuals named in those searches were not the defendant. One of them was the defendant's husband's real name, Myatollah Nerzad, and the other was another investigative subject. And so, the question is, I think it's a question that you started with, with respect to

# Oral Argument

opposing counsel is: Does the query matter? And the query does matter. The defendant cannot say that she has an interest in the searches of other individuals' names that are not her retrieving information. Those are separate subjects. And while they are related to her because they're family, that does not undo the fact that it's not her name, it's not her e-mail address, it's not her Telegram UID. Those are identifiers that would be related to her. But the names of other people, she cannot drag them into the search and say she has a Fourth Amendment interest in those searches and that therefore that query was inappropriate and violated <code>Hasbajrami</code> which, again, is very narrow on its facts to §702, to FISA, and to particularly what happened in <code>Hasbajrami</code> prior to the revisions of FISA subsequent to <code>Hasbajrami</code>'s decision in the Circuit.

THE COURT: What does "related to" mean?

MS. SHAMI: I don't think that the Circuit defines it. And as the Court notes, there are redactions. And so, I do not want to suppose what "related" means, I don't know.

But I do think that if the defendant is saying, any person who I am related to, if they're searched and some information about me comes out, how does that comport with Fourth Amendment standing? The defendant wouldn't have the ability to say because it's just not appropriate and it's been rejected. Well, I sent a message. I sent an e-mail to

this person and that inculpatory e-mail or inculpatory message sits on his phone and I have some standing to object to a search that doesn't name me on the other person's device. That's what's happening here. She has no -- it is not her device and it's not her name being searched.

THE COURT: So you searched her name and nothing came up?

MS. SHAMI: Yes, exactly.

THE COURT: Then you searched her husband's name or the other subject's name and then her information about her did pop up?

MS. SHAMI: Your Honor, the Government has a number of subjects and the Government searches the names of subjects and other identifiers.

As the Government noted with the military training document, the photo that we discussed earlier, the defendant's name is not on it. She is referred to by a kunya that the Government did not know she had until they were able to receive the translation in 2023 and then confirm through G-mail returns and the defendant's own statement that, in fact, it referred to her. So which is to say that it makes sense that the Government wasn't able to return that document in a search, it didn't refer to the defendant by her name. It referred to her by a name that the Government did not know until it found the document.

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

And as the Government also noted in its brief, even if we 1 2 knew the kunya, we would not have been able to return the 3 search because it's handwritten Arabic. It would not have rendered into text searchable Arabic to be able to find it.

In the same way that handwriting, someone's script 5 handwriting, if you try to render that into text recognition 6 7 and search it, you won't be able to get that information.

And so, here it just happened that the Government received information showing that an Umm Katab Al Muhajir received military-type training and they were able to connect that kunya to the defendant.

THE COURT: Can you remind me. Is the Government objecting to disclosing the queries?

> MS. SHAMI: Yes, your Honor, we are.

THE COURT: Why?

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MS. SHAMI: Your Honor, the searches that the Government conducts, the Government doesn't typically share those nor is it appropriate to share in this instance. the Government noted, the searches are done by agents, by the Government, and are just trying to identify information related to a number of subjects. And so, here, again, as the Government notes, the fact of the matter is that the searches that the Government conducted that retrieve the inculpatory information didn't name the defendant. The defendant has no entitlement to know all of the Government's

subjects.

THE COURT: How am I to make a determination if the searches were related to the defendant if you're not disclosing the searches?

MS. SHAMI: I think that sort of puts the cart before the horse because it assumes that the querying has to be evaluated. And it's only being evaluated under Hasbajrami's framework which is inapplicable here. The question here is, does the defendant have standing and she doesn't. The phone was retrieved abroad belonging to a non-U.S. national ISIS terrorist.

THE COURT: I understand. And I don't mean to cut you off. But if I disagree with you, that just because it was -- if I disagree with you that the database, as you represent, only contains information extracted by a foreign entity and given to the U.S. and therefore the Fourth Amendment doesn't necessarily doesn't apply, I need to know, and we can assume that it's a dragnet, I think maybe the defendant is saying they need more information to confirm that it's a dragnet. If it's a dragnet, I need to know what the queries were to understand if there was a Fourth Amendment search, or there was a search that implicates the Fourth Amendment.

MS. SHAMI: I think your Honor, again, that assumes that four steps out, we get to a place where we are

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

# Oral Argument

describing the NMEC database as a dragnet; and again, imposing the *Hasbajrami* framework. I think the gating question is, how was the information seized and searched abroad? That is the operative question. It was seized abroad. The Fourth Amendment does not apply extraterritorially. Whatever the Government received from a foreign partner, the Government is able to search. It does not need to come back and get a warrant. That is longstanding Supreme Court and Second Circuit.

And again, I also want to note that much of the litigation in *Hasbajrami* was classified and ex parte and I think that the classified portions, obviously, would provide more information but that's not what we have here.

And so, it's also trying to not only shoehorn what should just be a straight Fourth Amendment analysis into <code>Hasbajrami</code> but it's the redacted version of <code>Hasbajrami</code>. And I don't know how that sort of gets done because it is not the full picture. And as both the Circuit and Judge Dearcy Hall noted, the facts of <code>Hasbajrami</code> are just entirely unique to themselves. And the Government's view is that the Fourth Amendment, with respect to standing, with respect to foreign searches, with respect to non-U.S. citizens, all of those things dictate that there was no Fourth Amendment violation here.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. PRICE: If I may?

I think the Government's focus here on collection is absolutely misplaced. There is no question that there is a difference between Section 702 surveillance and the collection that took place here but that's irrelevant.

The Second Circuit determined that the §702

Program was lawful at the time. We are not challenging the initial collection here.

I will note that the NSA surveillance, according to *Hasbajrami*, the Second Circuit said that it occurred where those communications were made from which would be abroad in that case. But what we're talking about is the step beyond collection.

THE COURT: Sorry. I understand your argument to that point. But I just want to confirm I'm understanding your argument.

The Government seems to be saying if it's seized abroad by a foreign entity necessarily no Fourth Amendment issue or incident you're saying.

MR. PRICE: With respect to the initial seizure, that is correct. Can the Government go back and search that information at will as part of a massive database, that is a big no. That's the position that <code>Hasbajrami</code> explicitly rejects and they do so for a number of reasons. They lay it out and they talk about the fact that courts are

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

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#### Oral Argument

increasingly recognizing the need for additional probable cause or reasonableness assessments to search and to support a search of information already lawfully collected.

I'm talking specifically about Reilly versus California. Sure, you can seize the cell phone but you need a warrant to actually search the contents. The Court looks to the vast technological capabilities that this supported this database. The size of it. The ability to have in that case 250 e-mails annually, here we have 66 times that That that querying makes it easier to target amount. U.S. persons.

So the idea is that in Section 702 world and Hasbajrami, the Court was willing to overlook the idea of incidental collection of information about U.S. citizens for foreign intelligence purposes. It's a different story when you go back and query a database full of that information because all of the bits and pieces that you are collecting, you know, hundreds of thousands of cell phones. Second Circuit says, you can stitch enough information together about a person as if you had targeted them in the first place.

And so, it's saying digital here is different. This is not like a traditional cell phone search, it is something different, and it is beyond collection.

Collection is not at issue here. We are not trying to map

# Oral Argument

anything on to FISA. FISA is irrelevant to this case. The question is the database of that collected material. And the Second Circuit is saying you do not get to search at will a massive database like that without additional probable cause or reasonableness.

The search in this case. In the *Musaibli* case, the Government puts on a witness who talks about how it is very important for the Government to have all this information stored for a later query. They are not looking at in real-time. This is not supporting an ongoing investigation but it is meant as reference, as a library, to go back and search later and that is what happened here. It is also what the Second Circuit was actually concerned about in *Hasbajrami*. They're saying, we have more of a concern if this is getting stored and searched later as opposed to being passed along to the FBI in real-time.

So, here, we're dealing with a search of that vast library of data. And the Government does not get to do that at will under *Hasbajrami*. That much is clear.

Did your Honor have any other questions?

THE COURT: Did you have a response to the Government's argument regarding the good-faith exception?

MR. PRICE: Yes.

The searches here were conducted in 2023.

Hasbajrami was decided by the Second Circuit in 2019.

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#### Oral Argument

think there was more than enough time between the search and that decision coming down for the Government to recognize that conducting a database search of even lawfully seized material like this could potentially present a Fourth Amendment concern.

The Second Circuit did not limit its discussion to Section 702 except when, look, when we're dealing with databases that are this massive, this is the analysis that we have to go through. It wasn't dependent on the particulars of Section 702. It was looking at, well, do we have to have a different standard if we have, if we have a database this massive as opposed to just going back and -going back to the evidence locker and searching an individual phone. Are we going to treat this differently? And the Court said, yes, absolutely we are. And I think that logic holds true one hundred percent here. We're not talking about the initial collection about the lawfulness of that collection. The question is, is the database sufficiently similar? Does that database contain information about U.S. citizens? Is it large enough to pose a privacy problem if the Government were to be able to just search it at any point in time? And the Second Circuit absolutely rejected the Government's position here that they can go back and lawfully search anything that they had lawfully collected.

> Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

THE COURT: If they searched her name and nothing -- none of the evidence they're going to use came up that they searched something else, and information about her did come up, you would still say there is a Fourth Amendment issue to exclude that --

MR. PRICE: Yes.

THE COURT: -- evidence?

MR. PRICE: In *Hasbajrami*, in Judge DeArcy Hall's opinion, obviously, we have limited information about the queries but its says it used terms associated with defendant, with Hasbajrami. So other than his name. And I think that is what we have here in terms of searches for family members of Ms. Salman.

MS. SHAMI: Your Honor, I have three brief points in response because they need to be responded to.

Hasbajrami does not stand for the principle that as long as there is a database, the Government needs to get a search warrant. The Government maintains databases like N.Y.P.D., FBI, DNA. The Government does not need a warrant to query a name or a DNA match against the DNA database. This would impose a warrant requirement on every single law enforcement database that simply does not exist. The holding of Hasbajrami is not that broad.

The holding of Hasbajrami is specific to FISA and §702 because FISA and §702 implicate the most sensitive data

and a very controversial technique in collection. And the sensitivities and the application completely scoped why the Court ruled the way that it did in the Second Circuit and how Judge DeArcy Hall applied that ruling in reaching the queries with respect to <code>Hasbajrami</code>. And, again, even noted that her decision has no precedential value apart from the case at hand, it is because it is very specific. And so, the idea that it should be applied in this way to any database as long as it contains information about U.S. citizens. DNA databases have information about U.S. citizens, certainly they do, and its biometric information about them, DNA information about them. Information that potentially could connect them to other individuals.

The notion that simply a database means there needs to be a warrant does not comport with the Fourth Amendment nor does it comport with *Hasbajrami*.

THE COURT: I guess there is no need for us to keep going back and forth. But *Hasbajrami* focuses on the size and the scope of the database. But you're saying it doesn't matter how large the database is, that wasn't the focus, the focus was on the sensitivity of the database?

MS. SHAMI: The sensitivity informed the concern with respect to the size and the scope. But the sensitivity was paramount, among all other factors, as to what was being

collected.

And, your Honor, I do think that the defendant's concession that the seizure abroad cannot be challenged is just -- is reality. The Supreme Court has been very clear: The Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does not apply to the search and seizure by United States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country. And that's *United States*v. Verdugo-Urquidez, V-e-r-d-u-g-o hyphen U-r-q-u-i-d-e-z, 494 U.S. 259 in a 1990 case.

Here that is what happened...

THE COURT: I think we all agree, I think, that the search or the seizure and the extraction isn't the issue. The issue is when you put it all together into this database that is massive. Well, we're presuming massive. If it is a massive database, can you then go back and do a search without a warrant?

MS. SHAMI: Again, the question is just limited to the question of a database. And the Government submits that a database is not the hallmark of whether or not a search requires a warrant. The Government searches DNA databases without a warrant. The FBI searches its own databases without a warrant. It's information that is in the possession of a database because, frankly, when you get a DNA sample it gets input into a system.

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

# Oral Argument

There is no holding in any court that requires a warrant simply because there is a database. And the idea that the material that is seized abroad from foreign fighters, of terrorists, from Al-Qaeda, from ISIS has to be searched pursuant to a warrant simply because it ended up in a database is not supported by any law except the defendant's attempt to impose <code>Hasbajrami</code>.

THE COURT: Only if you want to search a

U.S. citizen in the database. I don't think they're saying

any search, well, maybe I'm wrong but a search of a

U.S. citizen in this database.

MS. SHAMI: And I think --

THE COURT: Without reason.

MS. SHAMI: It also cannot be supported because, again, the DNA database, the great example. If you search the DNA database for a U.S. citizen, how is that any different than what the defendant is positing here? The only difference is the defendant is arguing, well, it's so much bigger.

But size is not the determining factor here, the question is the collection. And that is what was at issue in *Hasbajrami*. The sensitivity of the data, sensitivity of the collection. And that is just not at issue here with devices belonging to foreign terrorists seized abroad.

Thank you, your Honor.

	Oral Argument 91
1	THE COURT: Okay. So we have a few more motions
2	to get through. It's also 12:20. I'm happy to take a
3	15-minute recess and to come back to finish it.
4	MR. PRICE: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.
5	MS. SHAMI: Your Honor, would we be able to take a
6	20-minute break around 12:20? I have another
7	THE COURT: It's 12:20.
8	MS. SHAMI: 1:20. As well.
9	THE COURT: So you want to keep going now?
10	MS. SHAMI: I think I would be happy to keep going
11	now just because I have another court appointment at 1:30
12	and I am happy to come back after.
13	MR. JACOBSON: If we can take maybe a five-minute
14	break?
15	THE COURT: Hopefully we'll get through at 1:20.
16	MS. SHAMI: That will be great.
17	THE COURT: Let's take a five-minute recess.
18	(A recess in the proceedings was taken.)
19	COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. Have a seat, please.
20	THE COURT: Is Ms. Salman with us?
21	MR. JACOBSON: Yes, she is.
22	THE COURT: Before I move on to the Bill of
23	Particulars, if anyone has any arguments to that motion I
24	did have one follow-up question for the Government regarding
25	the NMEC motion.

#### Oral Argument

And, as I understand it, as I believe I understand your argument, you are differentiating between the §702 database and the -- the §702 database and the NMEC database.

You are saying the §702 database is sensitive.

And then you also brought up the DNA database which I assume you would be arguing is not sensitive. And so, I'm just -- and the NMEC database is not sensitive is what I believe you're arguing is not a sensitive database.

How is the Court to determine what is a sensitive database, what is not a sensitive database? Why is the DNA database and the NMEC database not sensitive, but the §702 database is? Are there any other sensitive databases out there, or is it just §702 is a sensitive database?

MS. SHAMI: Your Honor, the §702 database, there is nothing like it and that is really what guided the Second Circuit. How information is collected. How the Government has to submit those requests, those authorizations, the minimization factors. The way that the Government searches or the Government's request have to be tailored. The way that they have to relate to a specific purpose. It is because of the inherent sensitivity of the information and the technique of collection that §702 stands for apart from any other database. And there is just no comparison between §702 and NMEC.

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

# Oral Argument

THE COURT: So I understand. So there are parameters that kind of guide how information is collected for the §702 database and that is what makes it sensitive. Is it just that that makes it sensitive so that no other database could be sensitive?

MS. SHAMI: I don't know that no other database can be sensitive. But I think that as the law currently stands, the §702 database stands apart in terms of the analysis and there is no other case that analyzes any other database the way that it analyzes the §702 database. And that is based on the specific framework, the sensitivities of the collection, sensitivities related to the technique and sensitivities of the information. It just stands apart in every metric that the Second Circuit's decision really focuses on those factors.

THE COURT: What does -- and I'm not -- what does sensitive mean? Isn't there a universe where some of the that NMEC would be similar to the information in the §702 database. Would it not be...

MS. SHAMI: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Not the same but similar information or similar data.

MS. SHAMI: Your Honor, the Second Circuit, I think, went through a couple of ways in which information is

# Oral Argument

collected with respect to §702 and FISA and the difference between, I think, upstream and I can't remember the name of the other variation and how that is affected, I mean, how the information is otherwise seized. How it is -- also implicates in instances other providers. It's just very different and it also is a very controversial and highly litigated database and statute, quite frankly.

FISA and §702 present very unique circumstances about the Government's perspective as the Second Circuit identified it, prospective real-time collection. And that sensitivity is very different than just the device and I don't have any case that I can think of that treats any other database the way that the Second Circuit analyzes the §702 database in Hasbajrami's circuit opinion.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MS. SHAMI: Could I also, your Honor, I'm trying to -- I was messaging with the clerk for my other matter, I know you want to go through the Bill of Particulars and we're happy to answer any questions about any motions that you may have. And we consulted with the defense if they had any objection. But just so that I could potentially go also meet the second obligation. If you wouldn't mind, if you have any questions on Motion 73, that is the other -- that's the third motion that I have that I would be responsible for.

#### 95 Oral Argument Which one is 73? 1 THE COURT: 2 73 is a motion to dismiss on the basis MS. SHAMI: 3 of pre-indictment delay. 4 THE COURT: Okay. We can move to that one next. Mr. Price is jumping up. 5 May I respond briefly? 6 MR. PRICE: 7 THE COURT: Are you going to tell me what 8 sensitive means? 9 MR. PRICE: I will say this. The Section 702 10 database, at least as far as the Hasbairami court was concerned, involved a lot of e-mails. The NMEC database is 11 12 going to involve everything that is on a cell phone. 13 it's e-mail, it's social media, it's photos, it's messaging. And I believe the Government even said last time that this 14 is chock full of sensitive information; so, that was one of 15 16 the reasons for not wanting to give us the results. But here, I think you can absolutely draw a 17 18 difference between COTUS and other databases. If we want to talk about cell phones, the Supreme Court has said a warrant 19 20 is required upon arrest to take and search a cell phone but 21 not your DNA under Maryland v. King. See, California v. Reilly. Cell phone data is considered highly sensitive. 22 23 That is exactly what we're talking about here and it is a 24 giant database 66 times of the §702 database. 25 THE COURT: Thank you.

# 96 Oral Argument 1 Let's move to -- was it 73 you said? 2 MS. SHAMI: Yes, your Honor. 3 And thank you for considering this application 4 from the Government. 5 THE COURT: No, of course. All right. Just a 6 moment. 7 So we're going to move to defendant's motion to dismiss due to pre-indictment delay, ECF Number 73. 8 9 Mr. Jacobson, welcome. 10 MR. JACOBSON: Thank you, Judge. 11 THE COURT: Go ahead. 12 MR. JACOBSON: The relevant facts here are largely 13 undisputed. We know that in late 2016 early 2017, 14 Ms. Salman was trafficked into ISIS territory. We know that in March of 2019, she surrendered to SDF forces in the town 15 of Baghouz in Northeast Syria. We know that she spent 16 approximately five years in the custody of the SDF in a 17 18 detention camp. 19 We also know from the discovery that in 2019 the 20 FBI opened an investigation into the Salman family. And as 21 early as June of 2019, law enforcement conducted an extraction of Ms. Salman's husband's phone. And by August 22 23 2022, at the latest, the phone had been examined and a 24 report had been filed. 25 We know from reporting in the New York Times that

# Oral Argument

in September 2023, the Government was working to repatriate the Salman family. Yet, Ms. Salman was not charged with any crime until May 2024, which was at least seven years since the alleged conduct, although it depends on the timeframe that we're looking at whether it's the complaint or the indictment, and five years after the investigation was first opened.

Now, the Government claims that the investigation only began in 2022; yet, they also concede that they knew that Ms. Salman was an American as early as 2019 when they started interviewing members of Ms. Salman's family. We have no idea why they waited three years to examine the contents of the phone by their estimation.

And even if we use 2022 as a starting point of the criminal investigation into Ms. Salman, that's still more than two years prior to the arrest and indictment in this case which itself would be an unconstitutional delay.

So I think, Judge, if any of the facts are disputed, we would at the very last least need a hearing. But due to the more than two-year delay, and by our calculation, five-year delay in this case, the indictment can be dismissed on the papers.

THE COURT: Do you have any proof to offer that

Ms. Salman has suffered an actual prejudice as a result of
the pre-indictment delay like witnesses or evidence that are

now unavailable due to the delay?

MR. JACOBSON: Sure, Judge.

It's always hard to -- we don't know what we don't know, right? And we have made numerous discovery demands on the Government for documents, for witness testimony. But what we do know is that after the fall of the Caliphate, thousands of documents were destroyed. And it's the very documents that we have asked the Government for and the Government says that are not in their possession.

The case law --

THE COURT: What documents, can you be more specific? You said you requested documents that were destroyed, which documents?

MR. JACOBSON: Other training documents, for example. We have received a few of them but the Government now tells us that there were at least 900 women who signed up just in Raqqa. We have a small handful of comparator Nusaybah Khatiba documents, training documents, but also sign-up sheets. The Government has also told us today that they have sign-up sheets only for the training in Raqqa but not for trainings that were held in alleged other locations. And we have requested all of that.

It's relevant for us to show by omission that

Ms. Salman was not on any of the sign-up sheets. That she
was not on any of the other types of documentation that you

# Oral Argument

would expect to see here. And so, that loss of documentary evidence not only between, for example, 2018 and 2019 but during the five years that Ms. Salman was sitting at Camp Solihull in Rujj is substantial prejudice to her ability to prepare a defense in this case.

THE COURT: And do you have anything to demonstrate that this delay was an intentional device to gain a tactical advantage over Ms. Salman?

MR. JACOBSON: I think there is circumstantial evidence of that, sure. The ease and the speed with which the Government was able to repatriate other Americans suggests that they delayed in repatriating the Salman family and Ms. Salman, specifically. We know for, for example, in the *Musaibli* case, he only spent, I believe, six weeks in SDF custody before the United States quickly repatriated him for the purpose of prosecution and that included -- and they had initiated their investigation prior to that so they were able to do it quickly and efficiently. That's true of all of the other repatriation cases that we are aware of since it seems as if Ms. Salman is the last American to be prosecuted after repatriation.

So there is just no explanation in this case of why they were able to repatriate *Musaibli*, repatriate other individuals in the Eastern District of New York, but were unable to repatriate Ms. Salman despite knowing she was an

American for years prior to that.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything in addition?

MR. JACOBSON: I think also as it prejudice, the loss of essential witness testimony.

Witnesses who knew Ms. Salman in Syria could speak to the fact that she hasn't been trained. Obviously, her husband is the -- would be central to her defense here. We don't know where he is. All these years later, it's -- we're significantly hindered in our investigation into figuring out his whereabouts in this case. So there is substantial prejudice to Ms. Salman and I think under the case law, the indictment should be dismissed.

THE COURT: Regarding the husband. That example of the husband being now unavailable or unable to locate him, why would that be more due to the Government's delay versus just where he is, his location, and what he is alleged to be involved in?

MR. JACOBSON: Right.

Well, if the Government had repatriated Ms. Salman in 2019, soon after March of 2019, the Government or the defense likely would have been able to figure out whether he had been captured by the SDF, which prison camp that he was located at. And due to the passage of time, it seems that the Government has no information on his whereabouts.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. SHAMI: Thank you, your Honor.

I think that the brief in response outlines the timeline and I don't want to rehash any of it unless your Honor wants to go into it. But I think the fact of the matter is that in 2019 ISIS collapsed, it was defeated. And the idea that the Government when it seized the phone from Abu Ali would have been able to instantaneously pick it out, of all devices, identify who the persons are, identify who the kunyas are, and connect them to the defendant in a way that treated that investigation above all others is fantasy.

The Government did not know about the defendant and did not open up an investigation until December of 2022. That is not two years from when she was charged, that is the -- that is 18 months, excuse me, from when she was charged from December 2022 to May 2024.

And the Supreme Court and Second Circuit are clear that the time that when you start counting is when the Government, when the prosecutor believes, that he or she has evidence of guilt. And if the Government believes that they need evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that is within the prosecution's judgment to determine.

And it is not a question of, well, she was in the camps and why wasn't she repatriated. Those are asides.

And, in fact, they are asides that are explained by documents that the Government has previously produced and

# Oral Argument

additional documents that the Government produced yesterday showing that the defendant and her mother were in the camps but were afraid of the Americans when they came to the camps. That one of her sisters was in Rujj. Was interviewed by the Americans and was concerned about being deported and they asked for help from the brothers, which is a reference to ISIS males, to prevent that.

The Salmans did not want to return to the United States. They only decided to be repatriated and made that request in 2023. It is not the Government's position that it will by force repatriate people into the country against their will. There was a request made and the State Department honored that request.

THE COURT: What happened in December of 2022?

MS. SHAMI: That is when the Government opened up its investigation into the defendant, in particular.

THE COURT: Is there something that caused that investigation to be opened then versus earlier like when the phone was first...

MS. SHAMI: Exactly. Right, your Honor.

When the phone was first seized, it was one phone among thousands, right? That's what was happening. And, in particular, as the Government's evidence showed, this was past of an operation called "Operation Goalie" where the defense, excuse me, not the defense, where the Government of

# Oral Argument

the SDF was seizing phones from ISIS fighters and supporters as part of the Battle of Baghouz which went over for two months. Thousands of devices were collected. And then they had to be routed to Iraq to be extracted and assessed. And then information from that intelligence gathering was being sent out to law enforcement.

So, in August 2019, five months after the seizure of the phone, that is when the Government understands we received the first sort of item from the Abu Ali phone which is the certificate of marriage between Abu Ali and the defendant noting that they were married. That did not initiate the investigation. The fact that she married an ISIS fighter is not in and of itself a reason to initiate an investigation in this case and that's not what happened.

Instead, later on, the Government received a photo book as part of the ongoing review in connection with a search of a subject that is not the defendant and they received a photo book of photos from the Abu Ali phone. And on that phone, were pictures of the defendant with the ISIS flag, with the AK-47 and that is what prompted the opening.

THE COURT: So that was around December of 2022?

MS. SHAMI: I believe so. I have the timeline in the brief and I can refer you specifically to the pages.

Again, at that point, the Government, the FBI, had not understood the import of the military training document

#### Oral Argument

because they requested the full Gold Copy. But as the Government noted in its brief, most of the documents are in Arabic or German; that requires translation. And so, they requested translations. And it was not until August or September of 2023 when they received the translation of the military training document that indicated that Abu Ali's wife, who they now know he had two wives, received training. So then they have to determine which of his wives is Umm Katab Al Mujahir.

Google returns, and the defendant's own admission during a November 2023 interview, gave the Government that information. And so, frankly, if you were to start counting as to when the Government had evidence of a crime to seek charges really would be November 2023 when the defendant admits that's her kunya and we have the training document. So counting from November 2023 until May 2024, it is about six months. And, frankly, at that point, the repatriation was pending and was being handled by the State Department separate and apart from the FBI. The FBI has nothing to do with the State Department's processes for adjudicating repatriation requests and whatever procedures need to happen in advance of that.

More than that, when the repatriation flight happens implicates all sorts of issues including security. At the time, in early 2024, there were a lot of, I don't

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

know how to describe them, but there were military happenings related to some other countries nearby that would have impacted the Government's decision to send a plane out there for repatriation. The safety of both the Government and the Salman family was at issue, frankly. And so, this issue that the Government can immediately repatriate anybody just does not comport with reality. And frankly, the Government did not initiate its investigation until 2022, the end of 2022, and did not form the basis for charges until the end of 2023 and that is when the Government submits the Court should start counting.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Shall we move to the Bill of Particulars if defense counsel has anything that you want to add to your papers?

MR. JACOBSON: I do. Briefly, your Honor.

And I won't belabor what's already in the briefing but I do want to address briefly a number of new facts that came up earlier today at argument.

I think starting from the premise, and this goes to the timeline, and what we know about the timeline in the case. The complaint says that Ms. Salman received military training in or around March of 2018 which appears to be based on the metadata of the photograph of the document. But the indictment returns several days later walks that

#### Oral Argument

back and we don't know why. It has an unusually wide date range saying that Ms. Salman was trained somewhere in Syria somewhere between July 2017 and February 2019.

Why the backpedaling? We don't know whether we have to defend against an allegation that Ms. Salman was trained in March 2018 or that Ms. Salman was trained on any day between July 2017 and February 2019. We simply don't know from the discovery or from the complaint or the indictment in the case.

The discovery, while voluminous, lacks a lot of critical detail about the date, nature, and location of the training. We have no photographs of the training, no videos, no map, no location data of the training, no information about the timing or the date of the training.

And we don't know what it entailed or who the trainers were.

But I think importantly, earlier today, the Government -- we had assumed that the trainings that occurred in Raqqa during the siege of Raqqa during July and October of 2018. The Government today, for the first time, without producing any discovery that points to this fact, tells us that, actually, trainings also occurred in Hajin in Al Barrakah; in Mayadin in Iraq, and possibly other places as well. So which actually, I think, makes the fact that the indictment says "Syria" all the more broad because we've now just been told that there were numerous locations in

Syria where Ms. Salman may have been trained. We have no idea where the Government actually believes that she was trained, they haven't told us.

The Government also says today that they'll be turning over sign-up sheets from for 900 women in Raqqa. We don't know if we will be receiving sign-up sheets for the trainings in other locations. We don't know how the Government intends to prove that there were trainings in other locations and we've received no discovery about trainings in other locations.

THE COURT: So you haven't received any discovery that tells you where any trainings took place?

MR. JACOBSON: No.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JACOBSON: Now, the Government says that we say that Ms. Salman was never in Raqqa. But it's also not clear if the Government credits that. Do they think that maybe Ms. Salman was trained in Raqqa? Again, we simply don't know because we haven't been told or given any discovery that speaks to that.

We also learned today for the first time that the Government doesn't know who Umm Yousef is which creates additional questions and perhaps we'll have to supplement our motion for a Bill of Particulars. But we no longer have any idea who trained Ms. Salman. Was it Umm Yousef herself,

108

whoever Umm Yousef might be. Was it some other individual 1 2 that trained Ms. Salman and Umm Yousef is just the 3 fictitious or individual who signed the document. Again, we 4 don't know. It's as if, Judge, as to location, if this were a gun possession case, an indictment would not say, 5 "Defendant possessed a gun in New York or California or 6 7 Pennsylvania or Florida," and that's essentially by proffer 8 only what the Government is doing today. That it was 9 somewhere in Syria perhaps in Ragga, perhaps in these 10 new -- these other alternative locations that we know 11 nothing about. And it's just -- it would be insufficient in 12 any other case and it's insufficient in this case, too. 13 THE COURT: It's not so much of them saying that 14 the defendant possessed a gun in the Eastern District of New York even if they don't tell me it was Queens or Brooklyn, 15 16 why is that not similar? 17 MR. JACOBSON: The reason that that's usually

MR. JACOBSON: The reason that that's usually sufficient is the discovery will include more specificity, right? We'll receive surveillance footage that shows a certain corner where an possessed a gun or we'll receive some other evidence that narrows that location range.

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So, without discovery that includes more specificity, an indictment that says, "Somewhere in the Eastern District of New York" would not be sufficient. But even the Eastern District of New York is a much narrower

location than saying, "Somewhere in Syria," or "Somewhere in the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States." It could be anywhere.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JACOBSON: And so, I think an indictment that says "Eastern District of New York" is only saved where the complaint or the discovery includes facts that allow the defense to investigate further as to the location.

THE COURT: Why do you need to know more at this time, a more specific location in order to prepare a defense?

MR. JACOBSON: Because we don't know if we're defending against an allegation that she was trained in Raqqa and we should be focusing our investigation on that city.

I think the Government can't proceed to trial with the theory that she was trained somewhere in Syria at some time. It's impossible for us to focus our investigation without more specifics, right? We can't interview witnesses who were in Raqqa and in Mayadin and in Iraq and in Hajin. It's simply impossible for us to do or to focus, for example.

And as to the sign-up sheets that the Government was mentioning earlier. If there were 900 women, well, should we assume that the fact that Ms. Salman is not on the

Raqqa sign-up sheets, does that mean she wasn't trained in Raqqa? The fact that the Government isn't producing sign-up sheets for the other places that they claim trainings were held, trained in those other those other locations, we just don't know because the Government has not produced discovery that speaks to that but they haven't proffered any more specific facts.

THE COURT: Is the location issue less of a issue if it's narrow to March 2018. And I know you said that they've walked that back. But if it is narrowed to March 2018 is the broad location less of an issue?

MR. JACOBSON: We don't know where Ms. Salman was in March 2018. So if the Government says -- we need to have both the location and the timeframe. Because if we know that if the Government is saying Ms. Salman was trained in, as an example, Mayadin in March of 2018 but we can establish that Ms. Salman was not in Mayadin in March 2018, that would be a complete defense to the charges.

So we have to be able to marry up the location and the timeframe. But we have neither here because we have Syria. And then, again, using the sort of gun possession analogy, we have somewhere in the United States between July 2017 and February 2019, the defendant possessed a gun. That would be insufficient in both respects.

THE COURT: Okay.

# Oral Argument

MR. JACOBSON: The location and the timeframe.

And I think, finally, the case law supports some narrowing of the date range and location here. We cited *Ray* in our motion. I think *Musaibli* is also instructive. I think that was a 30-plus month timeframe that the judge ordered the Government to narrow.

And Augustine and Pugh, which the Government relies on heavily, are just inapposite in this case. Those are cases that charge inchoate attempt crimes where the Government just has to show intent and a substantial step. And I know that in both of those cases there was discovery that was produced that laid out in great detail what those steps were, where they occurred, how they occurred.

And, you know, finally, I think timeline and location were just never an issue in those cases. It was very clear where and when the attempts were alleged to have occurred.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. REICH: Your Honor, as the Government made clear in its motion, in its opposition to the defendant's motion, the Government has provided ample information under the law around Bill of Particulars here.

It is important to understand that the Government cannot be compelled to disclose through a Bill of Particulars the manner in which it will attempt to prove the

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

charges, the precise manner in which a defendant committed the crime charged or give a preview of its evidence and legal theories.

In this case, the Government has given more than enough information for the defendant to be able to defend against these charges. The question is not whether additional information would be helpful, the question is whether additional information would be necessary. And, in this case, the Government is more than entitled to proceed to trial on a theory that allows multiple theories of liability here.

It is not the case, your Honor, that the Government backpedaled on anything. An indictment oftentimes has a broad date range. In this case, we have a much more specific date range in the complaint. And we have relayed to the defense multiple times through discovery and in our papers in other contexts in this case, and to the Court, that it is most likely that the timeframe during which the training occurred had to have happened after the marriage to Abu Ali which happened in July 2017, and no later than March 2018 which is the metadata on when the photo of the training document was taken. Mr. Jacobson mentioned something along the lines of 30 months as an appropriate range of time; this is much narrower than that.

So, your Honor, the Government would posit that

not only was the date range more than narrow enough for the defendant to be able to defend the case but also the other elements that the Government has already provided.

So, for example, your Honor, with respect to the location. Multiple cases in the terrorism context involve either indictments or charging -- other charging instruments or a Bill of Particulars which rise to the highest level of specificity being just a country where a particular thing happened. The Government cited examples from the defendant's own cases where a Bill of Particulars identified that training happened or material support happened in Afghanistan or material support happened in Pakistan. And in this case, identifying that it happened in Syria is more than sufficient, your Honor.

THE COURT: In those cases, did they give a more narrow timeframe?

MR. REICH: Your Honor, I'm not sure that timeframe was at issue in the way that it is in this case. But I will make two points on that question, your Honor.

The first is that, obviously, the defendant has the best access to information of any of the parties. The defendant knows where she was. The defense has repeatedly said that if we don't identify exactly what days and times and specific locations the trainings happened and who trained, et cetera, that they have no way of defending

## Oral Argument

against the case because they don't know where their client was. But, of course, your Honor, the defendant knows better than anyone where she was at any given particular time.

THE COURT: I mean, I think Mr. Jacobson made a good point. If they were presuming it was going to be Raqqa but now Ms. Salman is presumably not on that list, does that necessarily mean it's not Raqqa, or does it just mean that she wasn't on this list?

MS. SHAMI: Your Honor, that's a fair question.

The defendant stated unequivocally that she was not in Raqqa during that timeframe.

THE COURT: During what time frame? In March 2018 or between July 2017 and March 2018?

MR. REICH: Our understanding was that he was not in Raqqa at any time during that entire timeframe. And so, defense counsel can certainly make assumptions based on the information they have available to them from their own client that the Government has also produced back to them through her own statements.

THE COURT: And so, now you're saying, or

Ms. Shami said earlier, that there is multiple other

locations. The way for Raqqa they could say she was never

in Raqqa. But if they don't know what these other

possibilities are, how can they make that similar argument

that she was never there if that is an argument to be made.

### Oral Argument

MR. REICH: Your Honor, that can certainly be fleshed out at trial. But there is no requirement that the The Government specifically point out exact locations. If the Government's theory is that based on the overwhelming evidence she certainly received military-type training during a period of time in a general location. There is nothing about the elements of this offense that require any more specificity than that. And the defendant is free to argue before the jury that the evidence is not strong enough; that the evidence doesn't meet the standards. But that doesn't mean that the Government is not permitted to proceed at the level of extraction that the evidence shows.

And the Government would posit to your Honor that this is not at all like a case where if -- a §922(g) case with a gun. As your Honor identified, in that case, they could simply say that it is within the Eastern District of New York. And there is nothing about those cases in any event that require evidence that the gun was held in a particular place at a particular address. If the overwhelming evidence in that case proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was, in fact, in possession of a gun illegally, there is nothing about the statute that requires a showing that you demonstrate what particular place it happened in other than, as your Honor identified, the venue. And, obviously, in that case, there

that are not relevant

are issues of interstate commerce that are not relevant here.

So, in this case, the Government has more than posited evidence and provided discovery, and also provided information in its detailed charging documents that give more than enough information to meet the elements of this particular offense that don't require any more specificity than what the Government has already provided. And if the defendant wants to argue to the jury that we haven't been specific enough, then the defendant is free to do that.

THE COURT: How many training locations are there or were there?

MR. REICH: That's not something the Government knows specifically, your Honor. We understand there were multiple locations but we don't have any more specific information than that.

THE COURT: And to the extent you know, when you're saying "multiple," are you saying two or you saying 15. What range are we thinking?

MR. REICH: Your Honor, the Government is aware of a handful, three or four.

THE COURT: Okay. Those three or four are identified in discovery or will be identified in the discovery that you're -- or the discovery you gave yesterday, those three or four?

MR. REICH: That either is clear or will be made clear. It's certainly not something that the Government is hiding from defense counsel.

And another point I want to make sure the Court understands, your Honor. Counsel has sort of implied that the Government has some specific evidence that it's keeping from counsel so that -- and without which they can't defend the case. The Government is not hiding information about its allegations in this case. We are providing that information and they have ample information about the charges.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. SHAMI: Thank you.

THE COURT: Shall we move --

MR. JACOBSON: Very briefly, Judge.

I think the Government has made it impossible for us to even to provide alibi notice in this case which is required under the Federal Rules because we don't know where and when they allege Ms. Salman to have been trained. And now the Government is saying yet another claim they have no idea how many trainings there were. Maybe three or four, maybe more. So it just enables the Government to pivot in their theory. If Ms. Salman says I was in Mayadin on a certain date in her testimony, then the Government says, oh, well, it just happens to be that there was a training in

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

Mayadin or in Iraq or in Hajin or in other cities in

Al Barrakah. We have no way of defending against it. And
we have not received any discovery that shows these
alternate locations. Maybe the Government expects to
produce it but we don't have it yet.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JACOBSON: It's certainly something that we have moved to compel and I think it's essential for our defense. But I think, like, even the Government's -- the Government continues to use this hedging language that makes it impossible for us to defend against.

The Government just stated that, and I want to get the wording right, most likely that Ms. Salman was -- that her training most likely probably happened after her marriage to Abu Ali in July 2017. And the Government says that as if they're offering us some narrowing of the timeframe and scope here. But the indictment already uses July 2017 as the earliest date. It essentially says that, at some point, during the time that Ms. Salman was in Syria, she was trained in some location and that's all we know and to makes it impossible to defend at trial.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. REICH: Your Honor, if I could briefly respond?

I just want to make it clear that at least a

couple of the other training locations are clear from discovery that has already been produced including other documents that were stamped that counsel has referred to themselves. But, to be clear, it is not the case that the Government is going to simply create stories that Ms. Salman was in a particular place based on statements that come out in trial as Mr. Jacobson suggested. That's just simply not the order of operations. The Government has a theory that based on a document, it is clear beyond any doubt, and that's what we're presenting at trial; that at some point in that narrow timeframe, in a particular general location, the Government will argue to the jury that it is clear that she received military-type training based on this evidence that we have.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JACOBSON: Can I respond very briefly?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. JACOBSON: It is not true that the discovery we have to date shows locations of other trainings. The training document itself does not list the location. I think what the Government is referring to is the stamps on the documents that do have stamps, unlike Ms. Salman's, that have a stamp from various other directorates in other provinces in Syria.

The Government's own theory in their briefing is

	Oral Argument 120	
1	the stamp is only added by the directorate in the province	
2	where the training document is routed.	
3	So to the extent the stamps have location	
4	information in them, those are not locations of training,	
5	those are locations of the directorate that received the	
6	training certificate.	
7	THE COURT: Okay. Can we move to ECF 74?	
8	Ms. Shami, do you need to be excused?	
9	MS. SHAMI: Actually, I requested from the Court	
10	if they would allow me to meet later with them.	
11	THE COURT: Okay.	
12	MS. SHAMI: I can remain at the hearing here.	
13	THE COURT: Happy to have you.	
14	ECF 74.	
15	MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: Sorry, Judge, ours don't	
16	have the ECF markings.	
17	THE COURT: "Motion to Dismiss the Indictment	
18	Pursuant to Nondelegation Doctrine."	
19	MR. JACOBSON: I'm back up, Judge, on this one.	
20	THE COURT: I don't mean to cut off what I am sure	
21	was going to be a very eloquent argument.	
22	Let me just preface by saying I am quite skeptical	
23	of this argument in large part because of the district	
24	courts within this circuit and some courts outside this	
25	circuit have rejected it. And I understand your position, I	

	Oral Argument 121	
1	understand your argument fully, and I understand the	
2	academic sources you rely on, and this is a very interesting	
3	academic argument, but what case law can I rely on for this	
4	point?	
5	MR. JACOBSON: That's a good question. And I	
6	think it's in some ways we have to sort of intuit what the	
7	Supreme Court would do in a case like this because the	
8	nondelegation case law has not addressed a situation like	
9	this where Congress has delegated the authority to impose	
10	criminal liability to the Executive Branch, right? There	
11	just hasn't been a case like that so we have to look at, I	
12	think, the	
13	THE COURT: You mean this particular statute about	
14	the training or do you mean to any criminal case? Because	
15	isn't there a similar situation in cases where a person	
16	provides material support, isn't it the same issue?	
17	MR. JACOBSON: There are district court decisions	
18	in that context in criminal cases.	
19	THE COURT: I see.	
20	MR. JACOBSON: District court cases.	
21	THE COURT: So you want me to be the first?	
22	MR. JACOBSON: I want you to be the first and I	
23	think the reason	
24	THE COURT: To take down the statute and the whole	
25	principle?	

### Oral Argument

MR. JACOBSON: Yes. I believe that the Supreme Court will uphold the district court's decision in that regard because they have already signaled in cases like Gundy and FCC versus Consumers Research that the context of the statute is important and have also signaled that the nondelegation concerns are heightened in the criminal context, specifically, where the delegation creates criminal liability.

And I want to just address what I think is the Government's conflation of the grounds on which other district courts have denied challenges to §2339(b) and the ground on which we're challenging §2339(d).

Our objection is not with Section 1189 which authorizes the Secretary of State to delegate an FTO, we have no issue with that. There are other purposes that FTO -- other reasons why FTO delegation -- why FTO -- like, essentially why FTO -- FTOs serve functions in other context in government. The problem here is that Section 1189 is incorporated into a criminal statute, thus creating criminal liability in §2339(d). And I think the Government has conflated that. I think other district courts that have looked at the issue have conflated that and that is our -- that is the thrust of our challenge here today.

THE COURT: So you take this -- just confirming -- you also take issue with the Intelligible Principle

Anthony D. Frisolone, FAPR, RDR, CRR, CRI, CSR Official Court Reporter

# 123 Oral Argument entirely? 1 2 MR. JACOBSON: Yes. 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 MR. JACOBSON: And the reason we have an issue 5 with that is, I think, again, district courts that have looked at §2339(b) have not had the opportunity to address 6 7 recent FTO designations. And I think the recent 8 designations of drug cartels, for example, highlights the 9 fact that there is no outer bound in the delegation because 10 Congress provided no principle by which the Secretary of 11 State makes these decisions. And the fact that the 12 Secretary of State willy-nilly can say I am now designating 13 a drug cartel. I am now designating a gang or some other 14 organization as an FTO really proves the point. 15 THE COURT: But there are bounds but you just kind of disagree with how they applied those bounds with these 16 17 gangs; correct, or no? 18 MR. JACOBSON: There is a principle that's 19 articulated in §1189. 20 THE COURT: You just think they're not following it? 21 22 MR. JACOBSON: Right. And there is no meaningful 23 judicial review of designation of ISIS or a cartel or any 24 other organization. 25 THE COURT: Okay.

	Oral Argument 124		
1	MR. REICH: Your Honor, I won't belabor this.		
2	Just to say that the Government agrees that the		
3	law of this court is bound by is the law in existence now,		
4	not what it believes the Supreme Court might one day do.		
5	And I also just want to note that with respect to		
6	§1189, it's not clear to me how this is different from		
7	§2339(b), material support context. In those cases, they		
8	rely on the definition in §1189 just as much as it does		
9	here, and those are criminal cases just as much as here.		
10	And every single court to look at those cases has all		
11	reached the same conclusion.		
12	THE COURT: Thank you.		
13	MS. SHAMI: Thank you, your Honor.		
14	THE COURT: Can we move to Ms. Salman's motion to		
15	suppress statements at ECF 77.		
16	MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: Judge, we're prepared to		
17	rest on the written record. If the Court has any questions		
18	on this, I'm happy to answer them.		
19	THE COURT: No questions.		
20	MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: Thank you.		
21	MR. REICH: That's fine for the Government, your		
22	Honor.		
23	THE COURT: I think that is everything.		
24	Ms. Shami, I gave you an assignment earlier. What		
25	did I ask you to provide?		

	Oral Argument 125
1	MS. SHAMI: Yes, your Honor.
2	You asked for a best efforts affidavit in
3	connection with the efforts to locate the original.
4	THE COURT: Yes.
5	MS. SHAMI: And you had also given me the
6	assignment, or I had taken it upon myself, to give you a
7	case citation I finally did find while I was sitting here
8	which was the Bourjaily case that said you can look to the
9	document itself.
10	THE COURT: The hearsay?
11	MS. SHAMI: Yes, exactly.
12	THE COURT: I think you gave me that citation
13	already.
14	MS. SHAMI: I did.
15	THE COURT: Best efforts affidavit, how much time
16	do you need?
17	MS. SHAMI: I would need to just connect with the
18	agents because I don't know personally every single person
19	who might have run the search and all the details of that,
20	so three weeks?
21	THE COURT: Sure.
22	COURTROOM DEPUTY: August 28th.
23	MS. SHAMI: Thank you.
24	THE COURT: Mr. Jacobson, regarding the Bill of
25	Particulars, I believe did you say that you may, after

getting discovery, the discovery yesterday or some upcoming discovery, you may want to amend your motion?

MR. JACOBSON: I think we may have to, Judge.
We'll consider that internally and we can advise the Court.

THE COURT: Can I set a deadline for three weeks from today for you to either amend your motion or not.

MR. JACOBSON: So long as the Government provides the additional discovery before that.

THE COURT: I noticed they disclosed -- you did a discovery production yesterday; is that correct?

MS. SHAMI: Yes, your Honor we did.

But, in particular, the documents where there are indications that there were 900 women who signed up. And I think they've been referred together as the sign-up sheets. I haven't actually seen the underlying documents, so I won't call it a "sign-up sheet" but documents that reflect that over 900 women in Raqqa during the specific time period sought to sign up. That is on a hard drive that I'm currently seeking, that we are currently seeking the authority to produce to the defendants. And so, we've made that request, that request is pending. And hopefully, it's very quick because we believe that it's been released to another team. And so, hopefully, there isn't any kind of overlap that needs to happen. But as soon as we have it, we will be able to produce it but I can't give you a specific

Ī	Oral Argument 127		
1	time because I just don't know.		
2	THE COURT: I'm not going to give you a deadline,		
3	then, Mr. Jacobson.		
4	MR. JACOBSON: Thank you, Judge.		
5	THE COURT: After you receive the discovery,		
6	within a week of receiving the discovery, can you just let		
7	the Court know whether you intend to amend the motion and		
8	then I'll set a schedule for that.		
9	MR. JACOBSON: Yes, absolutely, Judge.		
10	And to be clear, we're not asking the Court to		
11	defer judgment on the motion. We can always file a second		
12	motion for Bill of Particulars.		
13	THE COURT: I see. Okay.		
14	I wanted to note last before we adjourn, Counsel		
15	for the Government makes a sealing request in a footnote in		
16	its opposition to defendant's pretrial motions that's at		
17	Note 30.		
18	To the extent the request is a motion, I'm going		
19	to deny that request with leave to renew. And the		
20	Government should make a motion for leave to file under seal		
21	on the docket in accordance with the Local Rules and a		
22	memorandum of law in support of such request.		
23	Anything additional before we adjourn?		
24	MS. EISNER-GRYNBERG: No, Judge. Thank you.		
25	MR. REICH: Thank you, Judge. Nothing from the		

	Oral Argument	128
1	Government.	
2	MS. SHAMI: Thank you, your Honor.	
3	THE COURT: Thank you for your preparation	today.
4	We're adjourned.	
5	(WHEREUPON, this matter was adjourned.)	
6		
7	* * *	
8		
9	<u>CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER</u>	
10	I contify that the foregoing is a connect transcript	of the
11	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.	or the
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